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MANY  PEOPLE  ARE  CONCERNED  that those who live in Eastern  Europe 
and  the former  Soviet Union  lack the attitudes-such as entrepreneurial 
spirit,  initiative,  leadership,  motivation,  and  the willingness  to take  risks 
and assume responsibility-needed to function well in a market  econ- 
omy. So many  people think  that such attitudes  are fundamentally  lack- 
ing in the former  Soviet bloc that it is popular  to refer  to people there  as 
homo  sovieticus, as though  they were a different  species of humankind. 
The idea seems to be that  years  of living  in a communist  system has pro- 
duced  a mind  set-even  a personality-different from  that  found in the 
For help and suggestions,  the authors wish to thank Hiroshi Amari, Gerwin Bell, Eliza- 
beth Goldstein, Lawrence Katz, Walter Kraemer, William Mahota, Natasha Mamedova, 
Yuri Muravyev, William Nordhaus,  Werner Ploberger, Thomas Richardson, Pat Ruzgis, 
Virginia Shiller, Andrei Shleifer, Toshiaki Watanabe, and participants in Cowles Founda- 
tion and NBER Behavioral Finance seminars. We also wish to thank the thousands of sur- 
vey respondents for giving their time to our study. This research was  supported by the 
U.S.  National Science Foundation, the Institute of World Economy and International Re- 
lations of the Russian (Soviet) Academy of Sciences,  and the Russell B. Sage Foundation. 
Part of the work for this article was done while Robert Shiller was a fellow  of the John 
Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation and while Maxim Boycko was supported by the 
Ford Foundation. 
127 128  Br-ookings  Paper-s  on Economic  Activity,  1:1992 
advanced  capitalist  countries,  and while these characteristics  probably 
are  not immutable,  they may not change  dramatically  for  generations.  If 
this homo sovieticus  theory is true, then serious problems  will arise in 
the formerly  communist  countries as they make the transition  to suc- 
cessful market  economies. 
Why  do so many  people think  that  people in ex-communist  countries 
and advanced capitalist countries have such different  attitudes?  Cer- 
tainly  people who travel  between countries  report  differences  in behav- 
ior. They may trade  stories, for example,  about  how much  more  helpful 
some waiters  or salespeople  were in capitalist  countries.  Differences  in 
economic behavior  between countries certainly  exist. But to what ex- 
tent are different  behavior  patterns  due to deeply ingrained  differences 
in attitudes? 
For example, people are observed to hoard more goods in their 
homes in ex-communist  countries.  Should  we assume  that  this hoarding 
behavior  is due to acquisitive  or selfish attitudes?  People are observed 
to spend more time standing  in line in ex-communist  countries. Should 
we assume  that  people queue  because of their  gregarious  or obedient  at- 
titudes?  Certainly,  better explanations  exist for such behavior-expla- 
nations  in terms  of the economic situations  that  people in ex-communist 
countries  face. 
Our  objective  is to sort  out some reasons  that  differences  in economic 
behavior occur between the ex-communist and advanced capitalist 
economies. We want to distinguish  factors  that  are attitudinal  from  fac- 
tors that are situational. Attitudinal  factors relate to psychological 
traits, personality, and culture.' Situational  factors relate to people's 
perceptions  of their  economic situation.  Relevant  factors  include  the in- 
stitutions  that affect them, their economic expectations, and their ex- 
pectations about how other people will react to their own actions. In 
economists' terms, attitudinal  factors are matters of taste and prefer- 
ence, while situational  factors  are  the perceived  constraints  under  which 
people operate. 
The relative  role of attitudinal  and situational  influences  in behavior 
is of crucial  importance  in determining  the optimal  speed for  pro-market 
economic reform  to proceed in ex-communist  countries. Situational  in- 
fluences may change quickly. If such situational  influences predomi- 
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nate, as policy regimes change, we may hope for quick progress;  thus 
reforms  should  proceed  quickly.  On  the other  hand,  if attitudinal  factors 
predominate,  then policy makers in ex-communist  countries might be 
advised to be cautious about the transition  to a market  economy. The 
parable  of Moses could well apply: Moses kept the Jews wandering  in 
the wilderness  and  out of the promised  land  until  they had  rid  themselves 
of destructive  attitudes  when the last of their  generation  had  died. 
This  research  is a continuation  of earlier  work  on differences  between 
popular  attitudes  in the former  Soviet Union and the United States. In 
earlier  work, we conducted identical  telephone interviews in Moscow 
and  New York,  focusing  primarily  on respondents'  attitudes  toward  and 
understanding  of markets,  their  views on such  features  as the fairness  of 
price  changes, and  the importance  they placed  on income equality.2  We 
first  used a few questions presented  in this paper  in interviews  for our 
1991  work.  This  paper  expands  the focus of our  earlier  work  to economic 
behavior,  rather  than opinions about markets,  and greatly  expands the 
populations  of people studied. 
Our  method  is to undertake  structured  interviews  of people in the ex- 
communist  countries  and  their  counterparts  in advanced  capitalist  coun- 
tries and compare answers. To allow intercountry  comparisons, we 
posed identical questions in each country (to the limits possible with 
translation). We  studied  three  ex-communist countries-Russia, 
Ukraine,  and eastern Germany-and three advanced capitalist  econo- 
mies-the  United States, Japan,  and  western  Germany.3  We conducted 
2,670 interviews over the past two years, both in person and by tele- 
phone, in 21 separate  sets of interviews  in six countries.  (We held more 
interviews  in Russia, Ukraine, and the United States than in the other 
countries.) 
Using these interviews, we can employ several ways to distinguish 
whether  people behave differently  in different  countries  because of the 
different  attitudes  they hold or the different  situations they face. The 
first  method  probes situations.  We can question subjects  in ex-commu- 
nist  countries  directly  about  important  perceptions  of the economic situ- 
ation  they face. When  it makes sense to do so, we can compare  their  an- 
2.  Shiller, Boycko,  and Korobov (1991). 
3.  We refer to eastern Germany and western Germany as separate countries because 
of their recent separation, even though unification occurred in October, 1990, a year before 
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swers with answers to the same questions given by respondents in 
advanced  capitalist  countries.  We can probe  only those perceptions  that 
might  be relevant  when people choose whether  to engage  in certain  be- 
havior,  such as using  initiative,  taking  risks, or working  hard.  For exam- 
ple, we can ask whether  they believe that  it is worth  their  while to try to 
convince their bosses to put a good idea into practice, or whether re- 
spondents  think  that  the government  someday  will  expropriate  the bene- 
fits of their  hard  work. From  their  responses, we can gain some sense of 
the likelihood  that  situational  factors explain  behavior. 
The second  method  probes  attitudes.  We can question  subjects  in ex- 
communist  and  advanced  capitalist  countries  about  how they would  be- 
have in hypothetical  situations  and compare  answers. These questions 
fully spell  out the situation  and  are  the same  in all countries.  Thus  differ- 
ences in answers  can only be attitudinal;  we hold constant  the situation 
and  allow only attitudes  to vary. 
These two methods are the main  techniques  in our arsenal. We also 
have one more method  that is of some value. This technique  was made 
possible for us by an odd quirk  of fate: a coup d'etat erupted  in August 
1991  in the midst of our interviews in Ukraine. This coup resulted in 
President  Mikhail  Gorbachev's  arrest  and  return;  shortly  thereafter,  the 
Baltic  states  were freed  and  Soviet Union  was completely  dissolved. We 
can compare  answers  to the same questions  before the attempted  coup 
and four months later to see how much the answers were changed by 
the coup attempt  and subsequent  events. Presumably,  deeply ingrained 
attitudes  will not change in such a short interval;  thus any changes in 
behavior  must be situational.  In contrast  to our second method, in this 
third  technique,  we hold constant  the attitudes  and  allow only situations 
to vary. Unfortunately,  we did not take full advantage  of this research 
opportunity  because we did not know it was coming. 
We need to offer some warnings  about  this research  effort.  Certainly, 
we are attempting  something  difficult-to  sort out reasons for people's 
behavior.  Interpreting  results  requires  some  judgment.  Any of our con- 
clusions  could  be easily criticized.  One  reason  that  economists  have dis- 
played a comparative  lack of interest in studying  the psychological or 
cultural  issues that we have considered  may be that it is hard  to rigor- 
ously establish the importance  of such attitudes. Those few intrepid 
scholars  who have tried  were roundly  criticized, and probably  many of 
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We have presented  many results in this paper, even results that are 
puzzling  or that  do not seem to discriminate  sharply  between  our  oppos- 
ing theories. Our methods are not so precise that we can sort through 
our  results  and  know  which ones will be useful to readers  trying  to make 
judgments about human behavior. The weight of the evidence from 
many  different  questions  concerns  us more  than  the results  from  any one 
question.  We do not want  to "data  mine"-that is, to present  only results 
that  seem to support  one view. Thus, between  this and  our  earlier  paper, 
we reported  more  than  90 percent  of the attitudinal  and situational  ques- 
tions  we asked  (not including  background  questions,  such as those about 
age or education). Sometimes we ask very similar  questions or seem- 
ingly  the same  question  in different  ways. This  method  is  justified  to con- 
firm  our  understanding  because survey  results  can be heavily  influenced 
by the way questions  are worded. 
Our methods are rather  exploratory, so we have not relied heavily 
upon statistical  tests; we are not always sure exactly what hypotheses 
we want to test. To our minds, so many issues of interpretation  arise 
with the results  that we do not have space to discuss them all; we must 
leave them  largely  to the reader's  own  judgment.  One major  issue of in- 
terpretation  is whether  certain  questions  really  are  probing  situations  or 
attitudes;  we admit that ambiguity  sometimes exists about how ques- 
tions should be classified. A few of our questions might better be de- 
scribed  as general  questions  about  economic behavior  that  may only of- 
fer clues about  situations  or attitudes.  Finally,  we must  apologize  to the 
readers  for the seemingly  erratic  choices of which countries  to use for 
which  questions.  The exploratory  research  that  we did  over time  in vari- 
ous countries  had a logic that  may escape readers  of this final  report. 
In the next section, we present  a literature  review  and  discuss our  sur- 
vey methods. We then discuss our results in an effort to sort out situa- 
tional  and  attitudinal  factors in economic behavior.  We try to sort these 
out  first  in terms  of everyday  life, on such  matters  as dealing  with  author- 
ities. Then we examine labor  market  behavior  and entrepreneurial,  in- 
vestment,  and saving  behavior.  Next, we look at pre-  and post-coup  re- 
sponses. We then examine the statistical significance of differences 
several ways: between ex-communist and advanced capitalist coun- 
tries;  between eastern  and western Germany;  and between Russia and 
Ukraine.  Then  we discuss some of the implications  of our  results  for two 
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outlook  and  behavior  and  a lack  of commitment  to current  firms.  We an- 
alyze the distinction between situation and attitude in terms of the 
weight  of all of our results. Finally,  we present  our conclusions. 
Previous Comparisons  of Communist  and Capitalist Countries 
It is difficult  to summarize  the vast literature  on attitudinal  differ- 
ences across countries  that might  account for differences  in economic 
success.  Psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists  have hun- 
dreds  of ideas about  research  that might  be relevant. 
Scholarly  discussion  of the role of attitudes  in economic  development 
dates  back  at least to Max  Weber,  who in 1920  made  a widely  cited claim 
that a "protestant  ethic" has fostered economic progress  in the West.4 
Nonetheless, the number  of tangible, concrete studies that might  give 
evidence of the importance  of cultural  factors  in economic development 
seems surprisingly  small, given this topic's enormous  potential  impor- 
tance. 
The promise-and doubts-surrounding this topic are  exemplified  by 
the journal Economic  Development  and Cultural Change,  which  was 
founded  by Bert Hoselitz in 1952  to study development  with a cultural 
perspective.  In the first  article  of the first  issue, Hoselitz expressed some 
interest  in economists' theories  relating  development  to such factors as 
new techniques  or new capital  instruments.  However, he then asserted 
that "it is doubtful  whether the transformation  of a society can be ex- 
plained  in such a simple fashion, and there is doubt that the obstinacy 
with which people hold to traditional  values, even in the face of rapidly 
changing  technology  and  economic organization,  may impose obstacles 
of formidable  proportions."5 
Despite his urging,  the  journal  never  published  many  papers  that  con- 
cerned study of such values. Instead, recent issues seem to be devoted 
to such matters  as measurements  of income distribution,  the determi- 
nants  of fertility,  the effects of foreign  direct  investment,  and empirical 
models of public choice. As we mentioned, the lack of interest in atti- 
tudes as determinants  of development  may be due to the difficulty  in 
4.  See Weber (1920). 
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making  solid  progress  in research.  Fortunately,  however, some scholars 
have tried  to make some progress  in understanding  attitude  differences 
in the communist  countries. 
One attitudinal  factor in particular-achievement motivation-has 
been the subject  of much  attention  as possibly explaining  differences  in 
economic performance  across countries. Careful  cross-country com- 
parisons in the achievement  motivation  scale have been developed by 
David McClelland  and  his colleagues.6  One  of their  methods  for evaluat- 
ing their subjects' achievement  orientation  is to show them pictures  of 
people in various  activities  and  ask subjects  to make  up stories  about  the 
pictures.  McClelland  and  his colleagues  counted  the frequency  of refer- 
ences to personal  achievement  in the stories  and coded the results. An- 
other of their methods is to find  a random  sample  of published  popular 
literature  and  then code the references  to achievement  in this literature. 
Both these methods  yielded  n-achievement  indexes for individual  coun- 
tries at a point in time. McClelland  and his colleagues reported  that on 
some occasions, the n-achievement content of popular literature  in- 
creased before times of rapid economic growth and decreased when 
growth slackened. Moreover, countries whose children's literature 
scored  high  on n achievement  tended  to grow  more  than  other  countries 
in the succeeding  25 years. Individual  college students  who attained  high 
n-achievement  scores tended  more  often to become entrepreneurs. 
According to McClelland, studies show that people with high n- 
achievement  scores tend to take moderate  or calculated  risks, and take 
on tasks of moderate  difficulty  that  can be realistically  completed.  They 
are  not risk-lovers;  they tend  to take  risks  that  can be moderated  by their 
own skills and for which they would "gain  the most achievement  satis- 
faction from succeeding."' McClelland  interprets  high n-achievement 
people as those who have the entrepreneurial  spirit that would foster 
economic  growth. 
However, the correlation McClelland  found across countries be- 
tween n-achievement  scores and economic growth  was actually  rather 
modest. Notably, economically  successful  Japan  scored quite  low on n- 
achievement:  McClelland's  score for Japan  was 1.29, compared  to an 
average  score of 2.00 for 33 countries.  The U.S. score of 2.24 was mod- 
6.  See McClelland  (1961). 
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erately  above the average. The Soviet Union, with a score of 2.10, also 
ranked  a little above average.8  Perhaps  McClelland's  scoring method 
is not finely focused enough on the attitudes necessary for economic 
growth,  and  too many  other  purely  economic  factors  impinge  on growth 
rates. 
Another potential problem surrounds  McClelland's  method: differ- 
ences in n-achievement  scores across countries  may  reflect  different  sit- 
uations, rather  than different  attitudes.  Differences  in such scores may 
reflect different  expectations that an effort to achieve will succeed, as 
well as different  motivations  to achieve. When  shown a picture,  people 
in one culture  may respond with images of achievement  because they 
have learned  to expect to see such achievement. That people in other 
cultures fail to think of achievement  images when shown a particular 
picture  may in fact be merely another  reflection  of the economic situa- 
tion in these economies. McClelland  and  his colleagues  were repeatedly 
criticized  for not giving  this possibility  proper  consideration.9  For  exam- 
ple, one study found that men with high n achievement  who worked  in 
firms  that offered no possibility of advancement  had lower n-achieve- 
ment scores after  three years.  10  Nonetheless, we do not wish to dismiss 
McClelland's  provocative  work for these reasons;11  rather,  we want to 
sort out the situational  factors so we can learn more about some of the 
same attitudinal  parameters  that  he studied. 
Another  attitudinal  dimension,  emphasized  by Geert  Hofstede, is un- 
certainty avoidance. His Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) is in- 
tended to measure  to what extent people are inhibited  by the anxieties 
created  by uncertainties.  The index is based on answers to three ques- 
tions. First, the index is affected positively by rule avoidance: agree- 
ment with the statement  "company  rules should not be broken-even 
when  the employee  thinks  it is in the company's  best interests."  Second, 
the index is affected positively by employment stability: employees' 
statement  that they intend  to continue  with the company  for more than 
five years. Third,  the index is affected negatively  by reports  of stress, 
8.  See McClelland (1961, appendix table II, pp. 461-63). 
9.  See,  for example,  Eisenstadt  (1963). For a response,  see McClelland and Winter 
(1969). 
10.  See Andrews (1967). 
11.  A number of studies have found that achievement  motivation  training programs 
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measured  by mean  answers  to the question  "how  often do you feel nerv- 
ous or tense at work?""2  Hofstede computed  values for this index for 40 
countries;  the mean  index was 64 and  the range  for the 40 countries  was 
8 to 112.  His UAI did not show any consistent  correlation  with McClel- 
land's n achievement. 
The only communist  country in Hofstede's sample-Yugoslavia- 
rated  fairly highly  on uncertainty  avoidance, receiving  a UAI of 88. In 
personal  correspondence  to us, Hofstede indicated  that he now has de- 
veloped uncertainty  avoidance indexes for a number  of ex-communist 
countries. Russia received a moderately  high UAI of 75; eastern and 
western Germany  had the same index value of 65.13 
Hofstede found little correlation  across countries  between his index 
and economic success. Japan  received one of the highest scores in un- 
certainty  avoidance  (UAI = 92), while Sweden  received one of the low- 
est (UAI  =  29).14 
Hofstede  was more  successful  in finding  an index that  correlates  with 
economic success with another measure, the Power Distance Index 
(PDI).  This  index is based  on mean  answers  to three  questions:  (a) "non- 
managerial  employees' perception  that  employees are afraid  to disagree 
with  their  managers";  (b)  "subordinates'  perception  that  their  boss tends 
to take decisions in an autocratic  or persuasive/paternalistic  way"; and 
(c) "subordinates'  preference  for anything  but  a consultative  style of de- 
cisionmaking  in their  boss."15  The mean  of the index  was 51, with scores 
for the 40 countries  ranging  from 11  to 94.16 High PDI countries,  where 
management  is more autocratic,  showed a distinct tendency to be less 
developed. We are inclined  to categorize  the Power Distance Index as 
an index of situation,  rather  than attitude  (although  this categorization 
is not unambiguous). 
The one communist  country in Hofstede's original  sample-Yugo- 
slavia-ranked fairly high on power distance, with a score of 76. With 
his newer sample  of Soviet export managers,  the PDI was 93, virtually 
at the extreme  high  end of power  distance.  This suggests  major  problems 
12.  Hofstede (1980, p. 164). 
13.  Hofstede reports that his sample of 55 export managers in Russia is "neither homo- 
geneous nor well matched with my samples in [the 1980 work] Culture's Consequences." 
14.  Hofstede (1980, p. 165). 
15.  Hofstede (1980, p. 103). 
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for the former  Soviet countries. Eastern  and western Germany  had the 
same  low PDI value of 35. 
Another intercountry  psychological or personality difference-dif- 
ference in individualism-has broad  implications  for economic behav- 
ior. The literature  comparing  patterns  of individualism  across countries 
has  been extensive, dating  back  as far  as the 1830s,  to Alexis De Tocque- 
ville's classic work, which compared  Americans  with Europeans  and 
found Americans  to be more individualistic.17 Many different  dimen- 
sions to individuality  exist and  there  has been a corresponding  diversity 
of studies. Quantitative  international  comparisons  have examined the 
degree of homogeneity  of societies, as well as synchronization,  the de- 
gree of personalization,  and the difficulty  of social interactions.  Many 
intercultural  studies  have compared  various  kinds  of child-rearing  prac- 
tices and examined the resultant lessons about cooperation, assert- 
iveness, and mobility. Intercultural  studies have investigated social 
perceptions,  including  the perceived  desirability  of such  traits  as consci- 
entiousness  and  agreeableness.  Few of these studies  examined  commu- 
nist countries, and few specifically  tried to correlate  their  factors with 
economic success. 
Fritz  Gaenslen  compared  certain  concepts of individualism  in China, 
Japan,  Soviet Russia, and the United States by locating 1,000  interper- 
sonal disagreements  drawn  from contemporary  Chinese, Japanese,  So- 
viet Russian,  and  American  fiction. He coded various  factors  evident in 
these fictional  disagreements  and inferred  differences  in individualistic 
tendencies across these countries:  he concluded  that the United States 
was more individualistic  than the other three nations. For example, he 
found  that  the more  prominent  a normative  argument  (along  the lines of 
"do it this way because it is proper")  the more likely the superior  is to 
vuin  in China,  Japan,  and  Soviet Russia,  but not in the United  States. His 
study reached  no striking  conclusions  about  the likely impact  these dif- 
ferences in individualism  would have on economic development, con- 
cluding  only that: 
First, Chinese,  Japanese  and Russian  subordinates,  more  so than  Ameri- 
can ones, may be expected to desire to push responsibility  onto those 
above them. Second, they may be expected, more than their American 
17. See Triandis  (1989)  for a survey  of literature  on intercultural  studies  of individu- 
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counterparts,  to desire  to present  superiors  with  unanimous  recommenda- 
tions rather  than confronting  them directly as individuals.  Finally, they 
may  be more  reluctant  than  American  subordinates  to participate  in deci- 
sionmaking  in the first  place.  '8 
Perhaps  Gaenslen's method comes closest to ours. Looking at dis- 
agreements  from fiction may abstract  from the economic situation  and 
thereby  inform  us of attitudinal  traits.  However, we think  that  there are 
better  means  of holding  situations  constant  across countries. 
Intercountry  studies have compared  how people in various  countries 
allocate time. F. Thomas  Juster  and Frank  Stafford  compared  the total 
hours  per  week that  men  and  women  worked  (including  time spent com- 
muting  and doing housework)  in Finland, Hungary,  Japan, the Soviet 
Union (represented  by Pskov only), Sweden, and the United States.19 
Among men, the total was highest in the Soviet Union, where men 
worked  65.7 hours. Next highest  was Hungary;  there, men worked  63.7 
hours  per week. U.S. men worked 57.8 hours per week. The total was 
lowest-55.5  hours  per week-among  Japanese  men (who ranked  high 
on hours  spent in market  work, including  commuting,  but who did very 
little housework). Among women, Hungary ranked highest: there, 
women  worked  68.9 hours  per  week; Soviet women  ranked  second high- 
est, with 66.3 hours per week. Japanese  women worked  55.6 hours  per 
week. U.S. women came in last with 54.4 hours per week. The total 
number  of hours  per week people spent  watching  television was highest 
in Japan  for both men and  women: men  watched 17.3  hours  and  women 
watched  21.4 hours. Those figures  compared  with weekly totals of 14.5 
hours  for Soviet men, 11.2  hours  for Soviet women, 12.7  hours  for U.S. 
men, and 11.5  hours  for U.S. women.20  These statistics  contain  no infer- 
ence that  people in ex-communist  countries  are lazy. However, as with 
all the measures described above, we cannot say whether any differ- 
ences observed  across countries  are  caused  by differences  in fundamen- 
tal attitudes  or differences  in economic situations. We cannot be sure 
18. Gaenslen  (1986,  p. 97). 
19. Juster  and  Stafford  (1991). 
20. Juster  and Stafford  (1991,  table 1, p. 475). Blanchflower  and Oswald  (1989)  com- 
pared  labor  force  participation  rates  in Austria,  Britain,  Hungary,  Italy, Switzerland,  the 
United  States,  and  West  Germany,  using  International  Social Survey  Program  data. The 
one Soviet  bloc  country  in the comparison-Hungary-yielded unexceptional  results:  its 
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whether Japanese men and women would not work much more and 
watch  television  much  less if they were transferred  to a Soviet-style  eco- 
nomic  environment. 
Questionnaire  Design and Survey Methods 
Our  first  surveys were undertaken  in Moscow and  the United States, 
as part  of the work  reported  in our 1991  paper.  None of the respondents 
was told that they were involved in an international  comparison  study. 
Instead, interviewers  identified  themselves as belonging  to a domestic 
research organization;  they were native speakers of the language in 
which they conducted  the interview. 
To keep the length  of the interview  within  reasonable  bounds, and so 
that respondents  would feel that they would have time to answer each 
question  thoughtfully,  the questions  were arranged  into short  question- 
naires. (We assigned letters of the alphabet  to each questionnaire  and 
designated  each question  by a letter  and  number,  such as A 1. These des- 
ignations  appear  before each question  discussed in this paper.)  Most of 
our surveys involved several such questionnaires.  Respondents  to each 
questionnaire  were told that  the interview  would  not take more  than  ten 
minutes. 
Table 1 summarizes  the methods we used to administer  our various 
questionnaires,  as well as the sample  size, dates, and  locales of our  vari- 
ous surveys. Questionnaires  A, B, and C were administered  by tele- 
phone  in Moscow from  May 5-23, 1990,  to randomly  sampled  individu- 
als 18 years of age or older: we received 130, 137, and 124  responses, 
respectively. In this and all of our surveys in the former  Soviet repub- 
lics, we personally supervised the interviews, hiring  the interviewers 
and managing  them ourselves. In the United States, exact translations 
of questionnaires  A, B, and C were given from  May 21 to May 23, 1990, 
to a random  sample  of individuals  aged 18  years and  older  from  the New 
York City Consolidated  Metropolitan  Statistical  Area. Key Communi- 
cations, Inc. administered  the three questionnaires;  we received 120, 
120, and 121  responses, respectively. We reported  many of the results 
from  these surveys in our 1991  paper. 
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Table 1.  Summary of Surveys 
Month  Sample 
Couintty  Locale  and year  Method  Quiestionnaire'  size 
Russia  Moscow  May  1990  phone  A  130 
phone  B  137 
phone  C  124 
United States  New  York  May 1990  phone  A  120 
phone  B  120 
phone  C  121 
Japan  Tokyo  February  1991  phone  J  126 
Ukraine  Kherson  August  1991  door-to-door  D  121 
(pre-coup)  door-to-door  K  123 
door-to-door  M  118 
phone  H  130 
Ukraine  Kherson  December  1991  door-to-door  D  131 
(post-coup)  door-to-door  PC  130 
United States  ...  September  1990  phone  H  123 
phone  U  127 
Russia  Omsk  February  1992  door-to-door  D  130 
door-to-door  K  130 
door-to-door  M  130 
phone  H  130 
Eastern Germany  ...  December  1991  phone  G  132 
Western Germany  ...  December  1991  phone  G  137 
Source: Surveys  conducted  by the authors.  See  text for more information. 
a. Questionnaires  J, PC, U,  and G contain questions  from other questionnaires. 
same questions with 126  respondents.21 A selection of questions from 
questionnaires  A, B, and C was used; questions  were not modified,  ex- 
cept for translation  into Japanese.  A single questionnaire  interview  was 
conducted  by telephone  from February  1 to February  5, 1991,  to a ran- 
dom sample  of respondents  18  years of age and  older. 
Two surveys were then undertaken  in Kherson, in south-central 
Ukraine,  about  300  miles  from  the Russian  border.  Kherson  is a port  city 
on the Black Sea at the mouth  of the Dniepr  River. Its population  was 
355,000, as of 1989. The city specializes in shipbuilding  and supports 
other industries,  including  oil refining,  glassworking, and canning of 
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produce.  The surrounding  countryside  is a once-arid  plain  that  now pro- 
duces grains,  fruits,  and  vegetables.  We asked  our  Kherson  respondents 
"What  language  do you consider  your native language?"  Fifty-four  per- 
cent of the 472  respondents  said  Russian;  40 percent  said Ukrainian;  and 
6 percent  said another  language.  Interviewers  conducted  the surveys in 
Russian. 
Although  Kherson  may be described  as substantially  "Russified,"  a 
distinct  regional  culture  exists that, we think,  differs  from  the culture  of 
Moscow or Siberia  more  than  the U.S. Midwest  does from  the East. The 
first survey (Ukraine/pre-coup)  was undertaken  from August 2 to Au- 
gust 19, 1991,  and  was underway  until  the day  before  the attempted  coup 
d'etat  that  led to President  Gorbachev's  arrest  and  triggered  the final  dis- 
solution  of the Communist  party  and  the Soviet Union. Although  we had 
planned  to obtain  a somewhat  larger  sample,  the survey  was terminated 
on that day. Thus, all answers are pre-coup.  Questionnaires  D, K, and 
M were conducted  on a door-to-door  basis and  yielded 121, 123,  and 118 
respondents, respectively. Questionnaire  H was conducted by tele- 
phone; 130  people responded. 
The second survey (Ukraine/post-coup)  was administered  door-to- 
door in Kherson  several months  later, from  November 27 to December 
18, 1991.  Questionnaire  D was used again  without  change, but to a new 
random sample: 131 people responded. In addition, a new question- 
naire, PC, was administered  that included  some new questions, as well 
as questions  from the other questionnaires  used in the previous survey 
in Ukraine.  Some 130  people responded. 
The second U.S.  survey, conducted from September  3 to Septem- 
ber 9, 1991,  by Key Communications,  Inc., questioned  employed indi- 
viduals aged 18 and older from the continental United States, using 
questionnaire  H, as well as questionnaire  U, which contained some 
questions from the other questionnaires.  We received 123 and 127 re- 
sponses, respectively. Respondents were chosen through a random- 
digit telephone sample  from the continental  United States provided  by 
Survey-Sampling,  Inc. 
In Germany,  surveys were undertaken  by telephone  from  December 
17 to December 20, 1991,  using a random-digit  dialing  method  that as- 
sured even coverage in both eastern and western Germany.  Respond- 
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sponses from eastern Germany and 137 from western Germany. A 
screening  question eliminated  respondents  who had not lived most of 
their  lives in the part  of Germany  they currently  lived, to eliminate  those 
who had moved since unification. The survey was carried out by 
FORSA, Gesellschaft  fur Sozialforschung  und statistische Analysen, 
Dortmund.  We used questionnaire  G, which contained  a selection from 
the Ukraine  questionnaires  and  a few additions. 
For  our second  Russian  survey, conducted  from  January  31 to Febru- 
ary 6, 1992,  we chose the western Siberian  city of Omsk.  The city, with 
a population  of 1,167,000  (as of 1991),  lies at the confluence  of the Irtysh 
and  Om  rivers,  some 1,400  miles  east of Moscow, across  the Ural  moun- 
tains;  it is 1,800  miles from Kherson. We chose this rather  distant  loca- 
tion in response  to criticisms  that  our first  survey, done in Moscow, was 
not representative  of the Russian  people. Omsk  is a major  port  and pro- 
duces agricultural  machinery  and railway  equipment.  It also has oil re- 
fineries, grain mills, textile plants, and a university. All four Ukraine 
questionnaires  were administered  door-to-door, except for question- 
naire  H, which was conducted  by telephone. Only a few minor  modifi- 
cations were made in the questions. We sampled  employed  individuals 
18  years  of age and  older  and  received 130  responses  to each of question- 
naires  D, H, K, and  M.22 
In preparing  the questionnaires,  we were confronted  by a serious  dif- 
ficulty:  the questionnaires  had to be presented  in four languages-Eng- 
lish, Russian,  German,  and  Japanese.  (The  Ukrainian  questionnaire  was 
conducted  in Russian  because nearly  everyone in Kherson  speaks Rus- 
sian.) Of necessity, we are comparing  answers to questions written in 
different languages (except for the comparison between eastern and 
western  Germany). 
In preparing  our translations,  we adopted methods  used by cultural 
anthropologists.  As much as possible, we attempted  to produce what 
those anthropologists  call "decentered"  translations, which contain 
"both  loyalty  of meaning  and  equal  familiarity  and  colloquialness  in each 
language."23  To prepare  such translations,  a questionnaire  is not drawn 
up  in one language  and  then merely  translated  into  other  languages.  That 
22. Yuri  Muravyev  directed  our  Omsk  surveys. 
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would result  in a "  uni-centered"  set of translations  that would give one 
language  priority  and  could present  terms  that, while familiar  in the first 
language,  could appear  exotic or unnatural  in another.  To produce de- 
centered  translations,  one uses an iterative  procedure-"back transla- 
tion"-devised  by anthropologists,  sociologists, and social psycholo- 
gists.24  Because much  of our research  was undertaken  sequentially,  we 
could not always employ such decentered  translation.  We used a back- 
translation  program  for our  first  United  States-Russia  (New York-Mos- 
cow) comparisons  and  then again  for our United States-Ukraine  (conti- 
nental United States-Kherson) comparisons. The questionnaire  was 
first translated  from English into Russian. Then, with attention  to the 
difficulties  of translation,  the English  version  was modified  and  the Rus- 
sian version was modified yet again. Independent bilingual readers 
checked all translations. 
In the United States, Germany,  and Moscow, all surveys were ad- 
ministered  by telephone. A significant  potential  problem  exists in com- 
paring  eastern  and western Germany  because eastern Germany  has far 
fewer telephones: only 17 percent of eastern German  households had 
telephones in 1989.25  In the former  Soviet republics,  the dearth  of tele- 
phones is less severe, but still an issue. In Moscow in 1988,  89 percent 
of apartments  had  telephones.26 Probably  about  half  of all apartments  in 
Kherson  and  Omsk  have telephones.27  Our  Ukraine  (Kherson)  and  Rus- 
sia (Omsk)  surveys avoided the telephone problem  somewhat  by con- 
ducting  door-to-door  surveys for all questionnaires,  except H. 
To get a random  sample  in the United States and  western  and  eastern 
Germany,  we used random-digit  dialing  methods conducted  by profes- 
sional  sampling  organizations.  In Ukraine  and  Russia, we used random- 
digit  dialing  for metropolitan  Omsk, Kherson,  and  Moscow and  random 
sampling  of blocks for the door-to-door  surveys. 
Sample  size in our results  is relatively  constant-about  100  respond- 
ents. Thus the standard  error  of a sample  proportion  is about  5 percent- 
age points  if the sample  proportion  is one half;  4 percentage  points  if the 
24.  Triandis (1972). 
25.  DDR in Zahlen 1990, Statistisches  Bundesamt, Wiesbaden. 
26.  Moskva v Tsifrakh, 1989. 
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sample  proportion  is 25 percent  or 75 percent;  and  3 percentage  points 
if the  sample  proportion  is  10 percent  or 90 percent. 
Survey  Results  about  Everyday  Behavior 
Our first set  of questions  aimed  at finding  out  more  about  situational 
and attitudinal  influences  on everyday  life. 
Situational  Influences  on Everyday Behavior 
We first asked  respondents  about  situations  everyone  faces  from  time 
to  time  in  formal  situations,  dealing  with  those  in  authority  either  di- 
rectly  or in arms-length  transactions.  As  with  all our  questions,  we  de- 
vised  these  queries  in light  of our own  personal  experience.  We  had the 
impression  that  institutions  in  the  former  Soviet  bloc  do  not  respond 
well  to individuals'  efforts  to be helpful,  and that when  people  interact  in 
formal  situations  in these  countries,  they  may  encounter  unsympathetic 
and even  hostile  behavior. 
Let  us first mention  an extremely  important  situational  difference  be- 
tween  the ex-communist  and advanced  capitalist  countries.28  More  peo- 
ple  in the  ex-communist  countries  report  that  they  do  not  believe  that 
incentives  exist  for people  to take  any  initiative  to do  quality  work.  We 
devised  the  following  question  to probe  differences  in situations  across 
countries: 
D3. Suppose  you had an idea how to improve  the workings  of your com- 
pany  or organization  and  you are  absolutely  sure  that  the idea is good. Do 
you think  it is worthwhile  for you personally,  from the point of view of 
your own interests, to try to persuade  your bosses to put this idea into 
practice? 
28. In this, as in all questions, we display  results from the ex-communist  countries 
first;  then, after  a blank  line, we present  responses  from  advanced  capitalist  countries.  In 
this  and  in all questions,  survey  size is the number  of respondents  that  answered  this  ques- 
tion. Although  international  differences  occur  in the proportion  of no answers,  we do not 
attach  much significance  to these differences;  they may reflect  differences  in surveyors' 
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Responses  in percent 
Survey 
Yes  No  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  53  47  102 
Ukraine  (post-coup)  63  37  105 
Russia  (Omsk)  60  40  110 
United States  90  10  126 
A clear difference  emerges  when responses  in ex-communist  coun- 
tries are compared with answers from the United States. This indicates 
that people in the ex-communist  countries face different constraints and 
different incentives  (if we can generalize from the answer to this ques- 
tion.) The difference in incentives  would tend to cause people to behave 
less  helpfully in formal situations.  The difference  in answers does  not 
indicate any differences  in respondents'  attitudes: it does  not suggest 
any lack of willingness to persuade one's boss to put the idea into prac- 
tice. To argue that the difference in answers is actually caused by a dif- 
ference in respondents'  attitudes, one would have to argue that people 
let their emotions  dominate their answers or that respondents  misinter- 
preted the question.  It is not our impression that respondents  had any 
trouble understanding and answering this question, which was based on 
simple facts. 
We sought further evidence of authorities' general unresponsiveness: 
H5. The streets are cleaned badly on your block. Suppose that you and 
twenty of your neighbors  are ready to sign a petition, demanding  an im- 
provement  in the situation.  Do you think  this will lead to any real  results? 
Responses  in percent 
Survey 
Yes  No  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  27  73  116 
Russia  (Omsk)  19  81  124 
Eastern  Germany  34  66  122 
United States  58  42  123 
Western  Germany  61  39  122 
H 1  1. Suppose  that  the relations  between  your  child  and  his teacher  are  not 
developing  very well. Do you think  it is worthwhile  to go to the principal 
and  ask him  to transfer  your  child  to another  class? Or  is it more  likely  that 
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Responses  in percent 
Worthwhile  Highly likely  Survey 
to ask  to refuise  size 
Ukraine (pre-coup)  43  57  75 
Russia (Omsk)  40  60  100 
Eastern Germany  70  30  103 
United States  79  21  116 
Western Germany  65  35  110 
H13. When you have to deal with officials at some government organiza- 
tion or institution, do you often feel distressed or humiliated after that? 
Responses  in percent 
Sur  vey 
Yes  No  size 
Ukraine (pre-coup)  62  38  99 
Russia (Omsk)  68  32  111 
United States  49  51  122 
The three questions above provide evidence  of the greater unrespon- 
siveness  of authorities in ex-communist  countries. A distinct difference 
in situation is suggested by the likely response  that average people ex- 
pect in formal situations.29 
The question remains why people in control or representing institu- 
tions in ex-communist  countries behave  so unhelpfully in formal situa- 
tions. It is not easy to pinpoint the situational influences that might cause 
authorities to behave  as they  do-certainly  not from a questionnaire 
given to the general population. Nonetheless,  we can ask our respond- 
ents whether they perceive that the incentive system encourages helpful 
behavior in formal situations. That was our motivation for the following 
question: 
H12. Imagine that you enter a shop and the salesman tries very hard to 
please you. Would you suspect that since he tries so hard he must be fool- 
ish or behaving strangely? 
29. These results  confirm  other  evidence, provided  by surveys by DiFranceisco  and 
Gitelman  (1984).  They asked, "Let's assume  that  a local soviet is considering  a new law 
which  you feel is unjust.  Could  you do anything  about  it?"  Only  7 percent  of former  Soviet 
citizens in a sample  of emigres  said yes, compared  to 51 percent  of Italian  subjects  who 
were  asked  a similar  question  (p. 609). 146  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
Responses  in percent 
Survey 
Yes  No  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  40  60  113 
Russia  (Omsk)  50  50  120 
United States  25  75  121 
From our personal experiences,  we expected even bigger differences 
in responses between the United States and the ex-communist countries 
than we found. Nonetheless,  the differences are in the direction we hy- 
pothesized:  more people in the ex-communist  countries feel that some- 
one in authority who tries hard must be foolish,  implying that no incen- 
tives exist for people to try hard. 
Attitudinal  Influences  on  Everyday  Behavior 
To learn about differences in attitudes across countries, we took care 
to prevent the situation from affecting answers  to our questions.  Our 
first attempt was to question  respondents  about basic  values,  thereby 
abstracting from the current economic  situation: 
MI 1. Which  of the following  achievements  would  please you more? 
A. You win fortune  without  fame:  you make  enough  money through  suc- 
cessful business dealings  so that you can live comfortably  for the rest of 
your  life. 
B. You win fame without  fortune:  for example, you win a medal at the 
Olympics  or you become a respected  journalist  or scholar. 
Responses  in percent 
Fortune  Fame 
without  without  Sluvey 
fame  fortune  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  67  33  90 
Russia  (Moscow)  65  35  92 
Russia  (Omsk)  81  19  107 
U.S.A. (New York)  54  46  117 
Japan  (Tokyo)  68  32  126 Rober t J. Shiller, Maxim Boycko, and Vladimir Korobov  147 
Little difference across countries  appears in the responses:  the excep- 
tion is Omsk, where money appears to be most important. Virtually no 
difference in answers appears to exist between Japan and Ukraine or Ja- 
pan and Moscow. 
Of course,  our assumption  that this  question  probes  basic  values 
could be questioned.  The economic  situation may affect answers if peo- 
ple in poorer countries have a more pressing reason to acquire wealth. 
On the other hand, the meaning of the term "rich" may be dependent on 
the level of wealth that one currently enjoys.  Thus the direction of any 
bias is unclear. 
We can more completely  control for economic  constraints by refer- 
ring to  a life-and-death  decision.  The following  question  probes  atti- 
tudes toward risk: 
H4. Imagine  you are suddenly  ill. Your  illness  generally  does not  interfere 
with your work  and does not prevent  you from  leading  a normal  life, but 
you always feel tired, go to bed early, and you are often in a bad mood 
because  of that. The doctors  tell you that  this tiredness  will continue  your 
whole  life unless  you decide  to undergo  a surgical  operation.  (Imagine  that 
you have complete  trust  in the doctors  and  you doubt  neither  their  diagno- 
sis, nor  the proposed  method  of treatment.)  The operation  will completely 
cure  you, but  it is risky:  there  is one chance  in  four  that  you will  die. Would 
you decide to undergo  this operation? 
Responses  in percent 
Yes,  No,  Survey 
take risk  avoid risk  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  61  39  105 
Russia  (Omsk)  58  42  97 
United  States  59  41  119 
Virtually no difference across countries appears in the responses. 
Some  leisure choices  also  seem free from influences  from the eco- 
nomic situation, so we posed the following question: 
H3. What  would bring  you more pleasure:  an opportunity  to see a town 
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Responses  in percent 
See a  Spend a  Sulrvey 
new town  day at home  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  74  26  121 
Russia  (Omsk)  68  32  118 
Eastern  Germany  65  35  129 
United  States  62  38  123 
Western  Germany  67  33  132 
Once again, little difference  appears between  the answers,  suggesting 
that people  everywhere  have  about  the  same  degree  of  wanderlust. 
However,  the possibility  exists  that the answers may be influenced by 
economic  constraints, even though the question does not imply that the 
decision  to travel will entail any costs.  For example,  Ukrainians, who 
reported more often that they would like to visit a new city,  may, be- 
cause of their current economic hardships, have greater need for a vaca- 
tion or the opportunity to shop elsewhere to find scarce goods or be more 
starved for the stimulation of travel. Nonetheless,  we think that answers 
to a question couched in such general terms are likely to indicate general 
personality traits, and in this area, we find little difference across coun- 
tries. 
To avoid any possibility  that economic  constraints  were a factor in 
the decision to travel, we posed another question.  This query assumed 
that the trip had been made and asked about a form of self-assertion that 
is not even remotely connected  to any economic  situation: 
H8. M10. Imagine  that  you are  on a tour  to a town you have never  been to 
together  with ten fellow tourists. None of you knows how to get to the 
train  station  where  your  train  is leaving  in half  an hour.  Would  you like to 
take the map in your hands yourself and start asking local residents  for 
directions?  Or  you would  be more  comfortable  if somebody  else does it? 
Responses  in percent 
Wouild take  Would  rely  Suirvey 
the map  on others  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  76  24  231 
Russia  (Omsk)  84  16  225 
Eastern  Germany  97  3  131 
United  States  81  19  123 
Western  Germany  97  3  133 Robert J. Shiller, Maxim Boycko, and Vladimir Kor-obov  149 
Again, little difference appears between  answers in ex-communist  and 
advanced capitalist countries.  What is striking is that the Germans are 
not at all shy about asking for directions; the pattern is the same for east- 
ern Germans and western Germans. 
The following  question was written to help us learn about attitudes 
toward day-to-day  business  activities.  The question  aims to ascertain 
differences in people's  willingness to undertake everyday activities that 
resemble  business  activities.  We  thought  that  organizing  a birthday 
party might be such an activity: 
M6. Suppose  that  one of your colleagues,  with whom you get along  well, 
is having a fortieth  birthday.  Your department  is going to have a small 
party  on this occasion. Would  you agree  to take the trouble  and  responsi- 
bility  to organize  the party? 
Responses  in percent 
Slurvey 
Yes  No  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  59  41  101 
United States  85  16  124 
Here we see a substantial difference. The Ukrainians appear less will- 
ing to undertake this sort of "entrepreneurial" activity. But we were con- 
cerned that the answer might reflect differences  in cultural attitudes to- 
ward friendship or social obligations, or the ability to turn down requests 
from friends. Also,  the costs of organizing a party may be very different 
in ex-communist  countries,  where the organizer may have to spend a 
long time waiting in lines or searching for scarce commodities.  Thus we 
altered the  question  in subsequent  questionnaires  to  assume  that re- 
spondents  will help throw the party.  We asked  whether  respondents 
would chose a more assertive  role (giving a speech) rather than a back- 
ground role (cleaning up afterwards): 
M6a.  A group  of people where you work is planning  a (small)  retirement 
party  for a friend  of yours. You have agreed  to help out. Which  of the fol- 
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Responses  in percent 
Give a  Clean ulp  Slurvey 
small speech  after the par-ty  size 
Ukraine  (post-coup)  47  53  77 
Russia  (Omsk)  59  41  74 
Eastern  Germany  52  48  128 
Western  Germany  58  42  130 
Some  differences  appear,  but  the differences  between  the ex-communist 
economies and the advanced  capitalist  economy are not substantial  or 
consistent. 
To summarize  this section, we would say that while the results are 
hardly  definitive,  they are substantial  enough to suggest that the gross 
differences  in attitudes  alleged  by many  do not exist. 
Survey Results about Labor Market Behavior 
Some of the most important  economic decisions that  general  surveys 
of the population  can illuminate  are decisions about the labor market. 
An important  issue facing workers  in ex-communist  countries  today is 
whether  to take ajob in the private  sector, whether  to support  the priva- 
tization  of their  enterprise,  and whether  to give political  support  to na- 
tional efforts at privatization  that would switch their own jobs into the 
competitive  private  sector. In our surveys, we asked people to describe 
the situation  as they perceive it. Then we probed  attitudinal  differences 
that  might  relate  to their  decisions. 
Situational  Influences  on Labor Market Behavior 
We begin  by documenting  the relative  lack of incentives  for hard  and 
productive work in government  jobs in the ex-communist countries. 
Then we present some evidence that more than  fear of hard  work is in- 
volved in people's decision to move to the private  sector. 
The following  six questions  were phrased  to discover to what extent 
people perceive government  jobs to be sinecures: 
K7. Do you agree  with  the following  assertion:  "The  most  capable  and  en- 
ergetic  people are quitting  work  in government  enterprises  and organiza- Robert J. Shiller, Maxim Boycko, and Vladimir Korobov  151 
tions and  are starting  to work  in cooperatives,  private  enterprises,  and so 
forth"?30 
Responses  in percent 
Survey 
Yes  No  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  67  33  112 
Russia  (Omsk)  65  35  116 
K  11. Do you agree with the following assertion:  "If someone is lazy or 
works badly, they will fire him sooner in  a  cooperative than in a 
government  enterprise"? 
Responses in percent 
Survey 
Yes  No  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  93  7  113 
Russia (Omsk)  79  21  111 
HIO.  Suppose that you or one of your fellow workers  is twenty minutes 
late for work. How would your boss react to this-would  he not take 
notice or would he give you a dressing  down (reprimand)? 
Responses in percent 
Survey 
Not  notice  Reprimand  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  35  65  92 
Russia (Omsk)  58  42  106 
United States  31  69  118 
H7. Imagine  that  you work  at a TV repair  shop. While  repairing  a TV set 
you have made  a mistake  and it broke  again.  The angry  customer  comes 
to talk to your boss. What  do you think  your boss is most likely to do in 
this situation? 
A. Would  agree  with  the client and  make  you fix it. 
B. Would  defend  you and  try to persuade  the client that  it is his own fault. 
30. In the Soviet Union, the term  "cooperative"  was a euphemism  for "private  firm.' 
The term  was conceived  while  political  support  for private  firms  was less widespread.  To- 
day, the term  is mostly  obsolete, but  it is still  commonly  used in casual  discourse  to refer 
to any  private  firm. 152  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
Responses  in percent 
Agree  Survey 
with client  Defend youi  size 
Ukraine (pre-coup)  74  26  98 
Russia (Omsk)  77  23  100 
United States  84  16  119 
K6. In your opinion, where are the better jobs for people who have about 
the same skills and abilities as you do: in the government sector or the pri- 
vate sector? 
Responses  in percent 
Survey 
Government  Private sector  size 
Ukraine (pre-coup)  44  56  99 
Russia (Omsk)  34  66  106 
United States  23  77  125 
K10. Do you agree with the following  statement:  "Those who work for 
private businesses  are working much harder than those who work in gov- 
ernment organizations or enterprises"? 
Responses  in percent 
Survey 
Agree  Disagree  size 
Ukraine (pre-coup)  63  37  103 
Russia (Omsk)  64  36  110 
United States  52  48  124 
The answers  to these  six questions  establish  that respondents  from 
ex-communist  countries,  more so  than their U.S.  counterparts,  view 
government  workers (the great majority of workers) as relatively  pro- 
tected from discipline.  Accordingly,  respondents  in the ex-communist 
countries tend to view a move to the private sector as a relatively bold 
and potentially risky act. 
However,  it does not follow that most people in ex-communist  coun- 
tries think that the relatively high degree of protection for government 
workers is appropriate: 
C3.Which of the following qualities is more important for the manager of 
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A. The manager  must show goodwill in his relation  to workers  and win 
their  friendship. 
B. The manager  must  be a strict  enforcer  of work  discipline,  giving  incen- 
tives to hard  workers  and  punishing  laggards. 
Responses  in percent 
Show  Enforce  Survey 
goodwill  strictly  size 
Russia  (Moscow)  33  68  112 
U.S.A. (New York)  49  51  109 
Japan  (Tokyo)  61  39  126 
The respondents from ex-communist countries certainly see the need 
for strict managers. (It is perhaps odd that the Japanese are the least con- 
vinced that managers must be strict. This may reflect differing standards 
across countries as to what constitutes  a "strict" manager, or it may re- 
flect the greater strictness of managers in Japan.) 
It also does  not follow  that the large number of people  who are re- 
maining in their government jobs should be interpreted as harboring any 
timidity or tendency  to avoid work. They must cope with other aspects 
of  their  employment  situation  beyond  merely  the  decision  to  work 
harder and take risks. Most basically,  workers may be unable to find a 
job in the private sector.  The following question was modeled after the 
question used by the U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics  to define unem- 
ployment, except that we narrowed it to ask only if respondents  sought 
jobs in the private sector: 
K4. In the last four weeks, did you try to find a job in a cooperative  or 
private  enterprise  or  joint venture? 
Responses  in percent 
Already work  Survey 
Yes  No  in cooperative  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  11  82  7  121 
Russia  (Omsk)  13  76  11  125 
We think the proportion answering yes  seems  rather high; more re- 
spondents sought work in the private sector in the four weeks preceding 
the survey than already worked in the private sector. 
The following  question  sought to identify other issues  that concern 
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K9. Suppose  that  you have worked  all your  life in a government  establish- 
ment or institution  and now you want to work in a cooperative. There, 
your pay will be much  higher.  In making  this decision, what worries  you 
the most? I will read you now five variants  of concerns, and you are to 
choose the two that  seem to you most important. 
A. Many  people are hostile to cooperatives  and private  enterprises,  and 
some of my friends  and  relatives  wouldn't  support  it. 
B. It isn't clear  whether  today's cooperatives  can survive  competition. 
C. I couldn't  count on the support  of my former  coworkers,  especially  in 
difficult  times. 
D. If I changed  my mind  and  wanted  to go back, it would  be hard  to estab- 
lish my former  position  and  my former  authority  at work. 
E. I would lose my chance to receive zakazi, free trips, quality  medical 
care, and  other  benefits  that  I now have in our  enterprise.3' 
Responses  in percent 
Survey 
A  B  C  D  E  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  14  36  11  24  14  140 
Russia  (Omsk)  17  37  12  16  18  153 
Here is a substantial list of concerns  that indicate reasons  to doubt 
that a move to the private sector would be wise, even for hard-working, 
adventuresome  workers.  The  most  important  of  these  reasons  in 
Ukraine and Russia is the fear that today's cooperatives  will not be able 
to survive competition.  Thus concerns  about the economic  outlook for 
the market economy rank high as rational reasons to remain in stable and 
secure government jobs.  We shall discuss these concerns further below. 
Attitudinal Infltuences on Labor Market Behavior 
When we probe labor market behavior,  it is difficult to write ques- 
tions that hold the situation constant because people are so familiar with 
their own markets and are likely to assume that the hypothetical  situa- 
tion  shares  the  characteristics  of  their  own  markets.  To  ascertain 
whether any difference in risk-taking behavior in the labor market exists 
across  countries,  we proceeded  by asking a rather long question  that 
spelled out the situation in some detail: 
31.  Zakazi are special offers of goods to workers at government expense;  they enable 
workers  to  obtain  goods  of  generally  higher  quality  without  extensive  searching  or 
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C12.  Imagine  that  you are offered  a new  job that  increased  your salary  by 
50 percent.  The new  job is no more  difficult  than  your  current  job, but not 
everyone  is good at this line of work. It could turn  out that after  a year  or 
two in this new  job you will be told that you are not doing  well in the  job 
and will be let go. Your chances of keeping  the job and your chances of 
losing the job are about equal. Given this situation,  would you take the 
risky, high-paying  new  job? In answering,  assume  that if your employers 
let you go, you could, after  some time, find  something  more  or less similar 
to your  old  job. 
Responses  in percent 
Survey 
Yes  No  size 
Russia  (Moscow)  52  48  117 
U.S.A. (NewYork)  79  21  117 
Japan  (Tokyo)  60  40  126 
A substantial difference  occurs  between  New  Yorkers and Musco- 
vites:  New  Yorkers are more willing to take the job.  Almost  half the 
Muscovites  would turn down the demanding new job-a  troubling re- 
sponse given our concern with lack of work motivation in ex-communist 
countries.  Still, the result is puzzling because  the Japanese seem to re- 
semble the Russians more than the Americans. 
Despite our effort to write a question that spelled out the situation in 
great detail, we were not entirely confident that the disparity in response 
between Russians and Americans provided any genuine evidence  of dif- 
ferences in attitudes. The different responses might represent a different 
reaction to the figure of 50 percent.  Some Russians who discussed  this 
question and the results with us said that 50 percent was small. Offers 
by private firms and cooperatives  of 200 percent increases in pay do not 
seem  at all unusual in Russia,  under current conditions  of economic 
change. The fact that 200 percent increases are commonly offered could 
mean that this is the reservation price in the Russian market, caused by 
the higher costs  that Russians may associate  with such job shifts. Or it 
could reflect a problem with the base to which respondents attach the 50 
percent pay hike. In 1990, when the question was asked, Russians faced 
repressed inflation and severe nonprice rationing; these conditions may 
have made a 50 percent increase in pay translate into a smaller increase 
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Because  of this ambiguity, we rephrased the question to refer not to 
a 50 percent increase in pay but to a 50 percent increase in one's standard 
of living; we used the revised question in subsequent surveys.  (Our later 
surveys  in the former Soviet  Union were in Ukraine and Omsk, so the 
sample is not entirely comparable. However,  our later surveys allowed 
us to get a broader comparison of answers to this question, including re- 
sponses from eastern and western Germany.) 
H6. Imagine  you are offered a new job where you would be paid much 
more  than  now, so that  in general  your standard  of living  will increase  by 
half, 50 percent. The new job is no more difficult  than your current  job, 
but not everyone  is good at this line of work. It could turn  out that  after  a 
year or two in this new  job you will be told that you are not doing  well in 
the  job and you will be let go. Your chances of keeping  the  job and your 
chances  of losing  the  job are about  equal.  Given  this situation,  would  you 
take  the risky,  high-payingjob?  In answering,  assume  that  if your  employ- 
ers let you go, you could, after some time, find something  more or less 
similar  to your  current  job. 
Responses  in percent 
Survey 
Yes  No  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  68  32  110 
Russia  (Omsk)  42  58  124 
Eastern  Germany  47  53  131 
United States  63  38  120 
Western  Germany  51  49  135 
With this revised wording, the spread between the Russian and U.S.  an- 
swers is about the same as with question C12 above,  although fewer re- 
spondents in both countries said yes to this question. This might be con- 
strued as  confirming the results  to  the previous  question.  However, 
some puzzles  emerge: respondents  in another ex-communist  country, 
Ukraine,  show even more willingness  to take the high-paying job than 
did respondents  in either advanced capitalist country.  Moreover,  little 
difference occurs between  responses  from eastern Germany and west- 
ern Germany; respondents in both countries were less likely to say that 
they would take the job. Thus these results paint no clear picture about 
differences between ex-communist  and advanced capitalist countries as 
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We can compare people's  relative willingness  to trade marginal in- 
creases  in pay for marginal increases  in work effort.  We  offered  re- 
spondents the following scenario:32 
B9. Suppose  that  for  certain  reasons  you are  offered  a ten percent  increase 
in the duties you perform  at your work place with the following terms: 
your  workweek  will  be increased  by one-tenth  (say, you will work  an  addi- 
tional  half  day) and  your  take-home  pay will also increase  by ten percent. 
If you take this offer, this has no other  effects on your prospects  for pro- 
motion  or relations  with  co-workers.  Do you consider  it attractive  to have 
less free time, but  more  money so that  you would  take  this offer,  or would 
you decide to reject  it? 
A. I will definitely  reject  the offer. 
B. I will be more  or less indifferent. 
C. I will definitely  accept the offer. 
Responses in percent 
Slurvey 
Reject  Indifferent  Accept  size 
Russia  (Moscow)  62  16  23  120 
U.S.A. (New York)  44  14  43  115 
Japan  (Tokyo)  33  45  22  126 
The  Americans  and  Japanese  were  split  on  this  marginal choice 
(which may be good news for the textbook model of labor supply), while 
a large majority of Soviets  rejected it. Perhaps incentives  actually are 
weaker for Russian workers. 
However,  a qualification is in order: when offered a scenario identical 
to the previous one in every respect but suggesting a marginal reduction 
in effort and pay, Russians gave seemingly inconsistent  answers: 
A6. Suppose  that  for certain  reasons  you are offered  a ten percent  reduc- 
tion  of the duties  you perform  at your  work  place  with  the following  terms: 
your  workweek  will be cut by one-tenth  (say, you will have an additional 
half  a day free)  but your  take-home  pay will also decline  by ten percent.  If 
you take  this offer, this has no other  effects on your  prospects  for promo- 
tion or relations  with co-workers.  Do you consider it attractive  to have 
32. Questions  similar  to B9 and  A6 were  asked  in the U.S. Current  Population  Survey 
(CPS),  the Panel  Study  of Income  Dynamics,  and  the Survey  of Work  Reduction  (SWR) 
supplement  to the Canadian  Labor  Force Survey.  Twenty-eight  percent  of workers  ques- 
tioned  in  the CPS,  and  two-thirds  of workers  questioned  in the SWR,  wanted  to work  more 
hours  at the current  wage. These data  are  analyzed  by Kahn  and  Lang  (1989). 158  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1992 
more  free time, but  less money  so that  you would  take  this offer, or would 
you decide to reject  it? 
A. I will definitely  reject  the offer. 
B. I will be more  or less indifferent. 
C. I will definitely  accept the offer. 
Responses  in percent 
Survey 
Reject  Indiffer-ent  Accept  size 
Russia (Moscow)  51  21  28  115 
U.S.A. (New York)  58  11  31  116 
From the Russians'  answers to the preceding question (B9), one could 
have expected  that the Russians would have been very likely to accept 
the offer. 
On balance, we are inclined to conclude that we have found no con- 
sistent evidence that people in ex-communist countries are substantially 
less inclined to respond to labor market incentives.  Perhaps, though, our 
inability to find a difference is a weakness  of our method; labor market 
decisions  may be too complicated for the methods we use. It may be im- 
possible to abstract from situational factors and still make our questions 
relevant to labor market behavior. 
Survey Results about Entrepreneurship,  Investment, and Saving 
Does  the situation in the ex-communist  countries discourage people 
from  taking  risks,  acting  entrepreneurial,  making  long-term  invest- 
ments, and saving? Or do their underlying attitudes hold them back from 
undertaking such economic  activity? We administered a series of ques- 
tions to find out whether important intercountry differences  exist,  first 
for situational factors, and then for attitudinal ones. 
Situational  Influences  on Entrepreneurship and Investment 
A fundamental situational question about how a market system func- 
tions is whether the government that regulates this system allows people 
to earn and keep profits. The following question probed respondents' re- 
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H14. Do you agree with the following  statement:  "The government  can 
give so much trouble and nuisance to rich people that it spoils all the pleas- 
ure that the money may bring"? 
Responses  in percent 
Survey 
Yes  No  size 
Ukraine (pre-coup)  65  35  91 
Ukraine (post-coup)  62  38  106 
Russia (Omsk)  55  45  98 
Eastern Germany  40  60  124 
United States  38  62  122 
Western Germany  37  63  131 
We find these results striking. At face value, the answers imply that most 
people in Russia and Ukraine (although not in eastern Germany) think 
that it might not be worth trying to get rich, even if one could be assured 
that one could grow wealthy.  We do not know from these answers how 
likely such government interference is thought to be. Nonetheless,  this 
evidence suggests that the profit incentive will be weaker in Ukraine and 
Russia. 
Some people have another reason to fear that they may not be able to 
enjoy the benefits of profits: they are concerned that government policy 
will change and the government will take their profits away from them, 
as the following question reveals. 
D03. How likely do you think it is that in the next five years the govern- 
ment will, in some way, nationalize (that is, take over) most private busi- 
nesses with little or no compensation to owners? Is that quite likely, possi- 
ble, unlikely, or impossible? 
Responses  in percent 
Quite  Survey 
likely  Possible  Unlikely  Impossible  size 
Ukraine (pre-coup)  9  41  32  18  104 
Ukraine (post-coup)  17  30  35  19  118 
Russia (Moscow)  20  40  29  11  114 
Russia (Omsk)  18  29  38  15  111 
U.S.A.  (NewYork)  5  11  53  31  118 
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People  in ex-communist  countries  tend to pick "quite likely" more 
often than their U.S.  counterparts. This response is consistent  with the 
result noted to the previous  question (H14): both sets of answers indi- 
cate that people in ex-communist  countries view government  as possi- 
bly spoiling the pleasure they could derive from getting rich. Moreover, 
in those countries, people may have worse fears than nationalization: 
D05. Please evaluate  how likely the following  is from  your point  of view: 
After five years or even earlier  the country  will return  to Stalinism,  the 
situation  in the country  will become so hostile  to cooperatives  and  private 
enterprises  that  current  owners  will wind  up in gulags  and  prison. 
Responses  in percent 
Qluite  Sursvey 
likely Possible  Unilikely  Impossible  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  7  16  45  32  100 
Ukraine  (post-coup)  14  17  31  38  119 
Russia  (Omsk)  11  30  23  37  112 
These  questions  imply a strange persistence  of fears of Stalinism: sub- 
stantial concerns  surface even  in the Omsk survey,  given in February 
1992, several  months after the Soviet  Union  collapsed.  We were  sur- 
prised to see that fears of a return to Stalinism increased in Ukraine after 
the coup. Perhaps respondents interpreted "Stalinism" broadly as refer- 
ring to analogous sorts of repression. 
Consistent with this fear of Stalinism is a finding that some people are 
still trying to maintain some of the old ideological purity: 
M5. Some people think that at work and in other formal  situations,  it's 
better  to keep to traditional  ideological  principles  and  not speak  or do any- 
thing  that  looks too "capitalist."  In your  opinion,  does such a view affect 
your  actions? 
Responses  in percent 
Survey 
Yes  No  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  33  67  88 
Russia  (Omsk)  35  65  84 
One-third of respondents in Ukraine and Russia said yes, certainly more 
than might be expected  if one assumed that many people believed  that 
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This view is accompanied by lingering fears of actual civil war: 
D04. In the course of the next five years, there will be a real civil war in 
the country,  in which  thousands  of people will die. 
Responses  in percent 
Quite  Slurvey 
likely  Possible  Unlikely  Impossible  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  6  33  33  28  105 
Ukraine  (post-coup)  9  25  41  26  113 
Russia  (Omsk)  17  41  28  14  116 
It is unclear what fear of civil war should mean for entrepreneurs,  al- 
though it certainly should increase risk. 
People in the ex-communist countries also have a less optimistic eco- 
nomic outlook, as the following question indicates: 
D02. How likely  do you think  it is that  during  the next five years  the stand- 
ard  of living  could fall dramatically:  people will have less food, they will 
have less clothing  and other  goods, and the quality  of the goods also will 
deteriorate  substantially?  How likely is that? 
Responses  in percent 
Quiite  Sulr^vey 
likely  Possible  Unlikely  Imnpossible  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  38  43  15  4  106 
Ukraine  (post-coup)  36  37  24  3  123 
Russia  (Omsk)  32  38  26  4  124 
Eastern  Germany  1  24  58  17  129 
United  States  13  49  35  2  126 
Western  Germany  3  40  52  5  133 
More people thought that this economic  disaster was quite likely in the 
ex-communist countries.  The exception  is eastern Germany, where al- 
most boundless optimism seems to exist. 
Respondents in ex-communist  countries expressed  some hope about 
rapid economic  progress.  However,  only a minority of respondents  in 
the following question expressed  strong optimism: 
DOI.  Please  evaluate  how likely  it is, from  your  point  of view, that  the next 
five years  will be a period  of rapid  growth  of cooperatives  and  private  en- 
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five years, the private  sector  will account  for at least half  of all production 
in the country. 
Responses  in percent 
Quite  Survey 
likely  Possible  Unlikely  Impossible  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  23  41  29  7  111 
Ukraine  (post-coup)  30  42  23  5  117 
Russia  (Omsk)  23  42  29  7  120 
We  wondered  whether  people  in ex-communist  countries  and re- 
spondents  in advanced capitalist countries  shared similar views  about 
the stability of their employers: 
G16. Do you think  that it is likely that the enterprise  for which you now 
work  is likely  to still  be doing  business  (though  possibly  in a different  insti- 
tutional  arrangement)  10  years  from  now? 
Responses  in percent 
Quite  Survey 
likely  Possible  Unlikely  Imnpossible  size 
Russia  (Omsk)  39  21  33  7  120 
Eastern  Germany  55  31  9  5  130 
Western  Germany  79  14  4  2  134 
The Russian respondents  expressed  quite a bit more pessimism  about 
their own enterprise. This pessimism  is coupled with a relatively nega- 
tive view of the product of one's own enterprise: 
K2. Do you think  that  the company  or organization  that  you work  for pro- 
duces something  valuable  to society? 
Responses  in percent 
Survey 
Yes  No  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  81  19  98 
Russia  (Omsk)  75  25  107 
United  States  89  11  123 
Rather more respondents said no in ex-communist  countries than in the 
United States, although the differences between the Russian or Ukraine 
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We narrowed the question to ask how respondents viewed their own 
work: 
K3. Do you think  that  at your  job you yourself  are  doing  something  that  is 
valuable  to society? 
Responses  in percent 
Survey 
Yes  No  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  90  10  107 
Russia  (Omsk)  68  32  111 
United States  89  11  125 
The responses  reveal somewhat more pessimism in Russia-pessimism 
that could discourage people from investing their time and resources  in 
the enterprises  where  they  currently work.  No  real difference  in re- 
sponses  occurred between  Ukraine and the United States.  Once again, 
the differences were less dramatic than we expected. 
We sought further evidence on the concerns people would have in de- 
ciding to open a cooperative.  We modeled our question on question K9 
above: 
M4. Imagine  that  you are thinking  of opening  a cooperative  in which sev- 
eral  people  would  work.  In making  this decision, what  would  concern  you 
most?  I will read  you five possible  concerns,  and  you are to chose the two 
that  seem to you the most important: 
A. Social opinion  is hostile to cooperatives  and private  enterprises,  and 
some of my friends  and  relatives  wouldn't  support  it. 
B. It isn't clear  that  today's cooperatives  and  private  enterprises  will sur- 
vive competition. 
C. The world  of business  is full  of cruel  and  dishonest  people, some as bad 
as bandits.  I would  not like to have dealings  with them  or to turn  out to be 
their  victim. 
D. Today's  government  officials  and bureaucrats  at various  levels would 
put a stick in the wheel of any cooperative  or private  enterprises.  They 
would  interfere  with  opening  a business, getting  raw  materials,  and  so on. 
E. I am afraid  that  in the future  the government  will change  its politics in 
relation  to cooperatives. In the future, cooperatives and private enter- 
prises  might  be abolished  and  the property  of their  owners  confiscated. 
Responses  in percent 
A  B  C  D  E  Survey 
size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  11  13  22  26  28  180 
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Respondents  gave  substantial  weight  to  concerns  about  potential 
government  interference  and fear  of  "bandits."  Oddly,  respondents 
voiced  concerns  about  competitiveness  less  often  than in answering 
question K9, which addressed a decision  to change jobs,  rather than to 
start a cooperative. 
Perhaps the  differences  between  the  ex-communist  and advanced 
capitalist countries are not as stark as one could conceive.  However,  the 
direction of the difference is plain: more features of the perceived situa- 
tion would discourage  a rational individual in Russia or Ukraine from 
undertaking entrepreneurial endeavors  or long-term investments.  This 
conclusion  does  not seem  to apply to eastern Germans, who are rela- 
tively optimistic.33 
Attitudinal Influences  on Entrepreneurship and Investment 
To measure  differences  in attitudes  about entrepreneurship across 
countries,  we can specify  the situation.  In the following  question,  we 
specified that the results of entrepreneurship would definitely double the 
respondent's well-being: 
Hi. Suppose  that you have an opportunity  to start  up your own business 
that  is guaranteed  to make  you rich:  all  things  considered,  the level of your 
well-being  would  double.  However, you would  have to work  a lot for this: 
during  the next five years, you would  have to work  hard  fourteen  hours  a 
day, six days a week. Would  you do it? 
Responses  in percent 
Survey 
Yes  No  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  57  43  109 
Russia (Omsk)  69  31  126 
Eastern  Germany  62  38  129 
United States  67  33  122 
Western  Germany  38  62  134 
33. The relative  optimism  of eastern  Germans  was demonstrated  in a different  way by 
a survey  that  compared  eastern  and  western  Germans  ("Frauen  zuruck  an  den Herd?"  Der 
Spiegel, November 19, 1990,  p. 123).  Respondents  were asked to rate their  opinions  of 
future  growth  prospects  in eastern Germany  using a 1 to 10 scale, with 1 representing 
"great  hope" and 10 representing  "great  worry." Eastern German  respondents'  mean 
score of 3.8 was more  optimistic  than  western  German  respondents'  mean  score of 4.8. Robert J. Shiller, Maxim Boycko, and Vladimir Korobov  165 
No great difference emerges  between  answers from the United  States 
and the ex-communist countries. This result refutes the notion that peo- 
ple in the countries of the former Soviet bloc lack ambition. We do have 
the odd result, however,  that the western Germans turn down the oppor- 
tunity for riches more than anyone else; at least one advanced capitalist 
country seems to be short on "ambitious" people.34 
Perhaps people  in ex-communist  countries  are timid about  taking 
risks when the risks could doom such a demanding, time-consuming en- 
terprise to failure. The psychological  risk of losing  in such a venture 
could be very different from the financial risk of losing in, say, financial 
markets. We asked the next question  in a smaller set of countries  and 
only to respondents who answered yes to the previous query: 
H2. Suppose  now that there  is one chance in four that your business will 
fail and you will be left without  any remuneration  for your efforts. But if 
everything  goes well-and  there are three chances out of four for this- 
you would  become  rich,  just as in the previous  case. Knowing  that, would 
you still decide to start  the business? 
Responses  in percent 
Survey 
Yes  No  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  80  20  51 
Russia  (Omsk)  80  20  74 
United States  74  26  82 
Again, no real difference in answers emerges between the ex-commu- 
nist countries and the advanced capitalist country. 
We asked respondents whether they would invest their own funds in 
a risky but potentially lucrative start-up: 
D7. Suppose  that a group  of your friends  is starting  a business that you 
think  is very risky and could fail-but  that might  also make investors in 
that  business  rich. Would  you be tempted  to invest a substantial  portion 
of your  savings  in it? 
34. In Omsk,  we altered  the question  for the M questionnaire,  replacing  "well-being 
will  double"  with  "well-being  will increase  five times,"  with  no effect on results. 166  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
Responses  in percent  Survey 
Yes  No  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  47  53  105 
Ukraine  (post-coup)  42  58  110 
Russia  (Moscow)  51  49  122 
Russia  (Omsk)  42  58  103 
Eastern  Germany  28  72  127 
U.S.A. (New York)  33  67  117 
U.S.A.  30  70  122 
Western  Germany  14  86  132 
Here a difference emerges between the ex-communist countries and the 
advanced capitalist countries: the people in ex-communist  countries are 
more willing to take risks. (While a smaller proportion of eastern Ger- 
mans answered  yes  than their U.S.  counterparts,  they  said yes  with 
twice  the frequency  of their western  German counterparts.)  These  re- 
sponses  may reflect the fact that the ex-communist  respondents  lack 
good opportunities to invest their savings.  Certainly, the results do not 
support the popular notion that people in these countries lack a risk-tak- 
ing mentality and thus cannot advance like people in advanced capitalist 
nations. This result is important for privatization efforts underway in the 
ex-communist countries; concerns have been voiced that citizens would 
be reluctant to invest in privatized enterprises.35 
We tried another tack: perhaps a difference  occurs  not so much in 
people's  willingness  to work hard or to take risks with their work,  but 
rather in their willingness to take on a position of responsibility in a busi- 
ness. The following question pursued this line of reasoning: 
H9. Suppose that you, together with your friend, decided to start up a 
small  business-so  small  that besides the two of you, no one else would 
work there and you would have no particular  dealings  with government 
officials.  You would  split  the work  equally,  but  each of you would  have to 
choose what  he will be doing. One of you would specialize  in production: 
he would  perform  the tasks of an engineer  and  a worker.  The other  would 
manage  the business:  he would  negotiate  supplies  of raw  materials,  would 
arrange  sales of your  products  through  shops, and  bear  material  responsi- 
35. Recent  experience  in Russia  is encouraging.  In Moscow, some recent  initial  public 
offerings  have raised  from  one billion  to three  billion  rubles;  individual  investors  put up 
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bility for the general situation at your enterprise.  Which role would you 
choose  for yourself? 
Responses  in percent 
Survey 
Production  Management  size 
Ukraine (pre-coup)  61  39  100 
Russia (Omsk)  62  38  103 
Eastern  Germany  45  55  123 
United States  36  64  123 
Western  Germany  42  58  132 
Here  we  see  some  indication  that  Russian  and  Ukrainian  respondents 
are less  willing  to  take  on  an entrepreneurial  role.  However,  no  differ- 
ence  in responses  emerged  between  eastern  and western  Germans.  We 
included  the factor  "you  would  have  no particular  dealings  with  govern- 
ment  officials"  so  that  respondents  from  the  ex-communist  countries 
would  not expect  to contend  with  trouble  from  a government  that possi- 
bly  was  unsympathetic.  Nonetheless,  we  cannot  be  sure  that  respond- 
ents  in the  ex-communist  countries  did  not  imagine  that  managing  the 
business  would  be more  onerous  in their  own  country  than  in advanced 
capitalist  countries. 
We probed  respondents'  perceptions  of people  in business: 
C I  1. Do you think that it is likely to be difficult to make friends with people 
who have their own business (as an individual or through a small corpora- 
tion) and are trying to make a profit? 
Responses  in percent 
Survey 
Yes  No  size 
Russia (Moscow)  51  50  111 
U.S.A.  (New  York)  20  80  121 
Japan (Tokyo)  43  57  126 
A negative  attitude  toward  business  people  emerges  more  frequently 
in  Russia  than  in  the  United  States.  However,  a  surprising  result 
emerged:  the  negative  attitude  is  about  as  prevalent  in Japan.  Perhaps 
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may be more difficult to make friends with people  in different social 
strata. 
We wondered  whether  respondents  in the ex-communist  countries 
would advise someone  else to become an entrepreneur: 
DI. Imagine  that  your  neighbor,  a young  man  of 16  years  deciding  what  he 
will become, seeks your advice. His abilities  and inclinations  allow him 
to choose among  the following  professions:  teacher, officer, manager,  or 
journalist.  Which  would  you advise? 
Responses  in percent 
Survey 
Teacher  Officer  Manager  Jouirnalist  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  25  16  37  22  106 
Ukraine  (post-coup)  16  12  52  20  113 
Russia (Omsk)  28  12  54  6  108 
The most popular answer was manager: when advising others, people in 
ex-communist  countries  think manager is a good  occupation,  despite 
their reservations (in question H9, above) about assuming a managerial 
role  themselves.  Moreover,  the  proportion  choosing  manager  rose 
sharply following  the coup.  More than half the respondents  favored  a 
career as manager-a  high proportion when the choice  was one career 
in four. 
To summarize the results of questions in this section,  we find no con- 
sistent pattern that people in the ex-communist  countries lack ambition 
or entrepreneurial spirit, and no evidence  that people in those countries 
are reluctant to take risks. 
Savings  Behavior 
Some  people  think that because  the ex-coinmunist  countries  place 
very different constraints on consumers,  the saving and investment situ- 
ation in those countries is qualitatively different than that in advanced 
capitalist countries.  The difference was thought to be especially  strong 
before prices were decontrolled in the former Soviet republics and when 
severe rationing and repressed inflation were widespread.  Before price 
controls  were  lifted,  it was  widely  thought that a ruble overhang-a 
large  stock  of  savings  accumulated  by  people  unable  to  spend  the Robert J. Shiller, Maxim Boycko, and Vladimir Korobov  169 
money-existed.  While this extreme  situation no longer exists,  the re- 
sults from some of the questions we asked while prices were controlled 
may still be of some relevance;  some talk about a ruble overhang con- 
tinues. 
In May 1990 we asked Muscovites  a couple of questions about saving. 
These questions do not fit squarely into our situational versus attitudinal 
paradigm. Nonetheless,  they may offer some insights into how the dif- 
fering economic  situation in the ex-communist  countries may influence 
behavior. There is no question that the situation regarding savings has 
been different in ex-communist  countries.  In May 1990, people had vir- 
tually no opportunity to invest their money. Savings banks offered rates 
of return on deposits  of 2 or 3 percent-rates  fixed by law. Consumer 
loans and mortgage loans were virtually unknown.  Pensions  provided 
by the government  were  usually  quite low.  There is a question,  how- 
ever, whether this different situation was such as to cause important dif- 
ferences in saving behavior. 
We found that about the same proportion of respondents  in Russia 
and the United States saved money in the previous year: 
A1l. Did you save any money  from  the income  you earned  last year? 
Responses  in percent 
Survey 
Yes  No  size 
Russia (Moscow)  58  42  128 
U.S.A. (New York)  55  45  117 
Still more surprising, people  in the two countries gave  similar reasons 
for saving money: 
A12. Which  of the following  is the best explanation  why you saved? 
A. Because to acquire the things I want takes too much effort. I just 
couldn't  spend  the money. 
B. I put money  away for old age, in case of illness or other  unforeseeable 
circumstances. 
C. I saved  money  so that  I will have  the means  to buy a vacation  home, an 
apartment,  automobile,  or other  such things  of long-term  use. 
D. I hoped that better things will be available  for my money in future 
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Responses  in percent 
Survey 
A  B  C  D  size 
Russia (Moscow)  6  27  50  17  70 
U.S.A.  (New  York)  4  41  39  17  54 
We thought  that  the Russian  responses might  reflect  the queuing  and 
huge shortages  in the goods markets  that Russian  consumers  face, and 
thus  that  Russians  might  choose responses  A and  D more  often  than  they 
chose responses B and C. However, they did not: Russians  and Ameri- 
cans chose responses A and D in virtually  the same proportion.  Only a 
minor  difference  surfaced:  for the Russians,  accumulation  of savings  for 
major consumer items (response C) was relatively more important, 
while the precautionary  motive to save (response  B) was relatively  less 
important.  These responses may reflect the underdevelopment  of con- 
sumer  credit  in Russia. 
From  these results,  we conclude  that  there  was no bottled-up  demand 
caused by an inability  to spend rubles  (a ruble  overhang).36  It would ap- 
pear that situational  factors did not differ so greatly-even  during  the 
period  of extreme  rationing  that  we observed-to  cause much  difference 
in saving  behavior. 
Gauging the Effects of the Coup Attempt and Subsequent Events 
Many  of our results compare  responses given  just before  the August 
1991  coup attempt  with  answers  given  four  months  later,  when  the disso- 
lution  of the Soviet Union was already  planned  and  price  decontrol  was 
already  beginning  in Ukraine.37  The timing  of our first  survey was quite 
fortunate;  this good fortune enabled us to learn something  about how 
this major  political  event affected economic perceptions. Our  pre- and 
post-coup  comparisons  are  an "event  study"  (to borrow  a term  from  em- 
pirical  finance)  because our two surveys were separated  by about the 
36. Many,  including  Cochrane  and  Ickes (1991),  have argued  that  as long  as operative 
markets  exist, even in an  economy  with  much  rationing,  an  inability  to spend  rubles  cannot 
occur. 
37. The red  flag  was lowered  over the Kremlin  on December  25, 1991.  Price  decontrol 
began  in Russia  on January  2, 1992,  but  had  started  several  weeks earlier  in Ukraine. RobertJ.  Shiller, Maxim Boycko, and Vladimir Korobov  171 
shortest possible interval of time in which the effects of this major 
change could become apparent.  An event study offers a particular  ad- 
vantage:  because the interval  of time is sufficiently  short  and  is concen- 
trated  upon a period surrounding  a particular  major  change, not much 
time  elapses to let any other  factors  affect  results. Certainly,  not enough 
time  passed for deeply ingrained  attitudes  to change. 
In Ukraine after the coup attempt, we found that people seemed 
slightly  more optimistic  that the economy might  prosper. (The percent 
choosing  the most  optimistic  answer  to a question  about  the potential  for 
economic  growth  [question  DOI]  rose from  23 to 30 percent.)  However, 
people  barely  changed  their  assessment  of the risk  of economic  catastro- 
phe (see question  D02). After  the coup attempt,  respondents  were more 
likely to urge  a young  person  to pursue  a career  as a manager.  (In ques- 
tion D1, the percent choosing manager  rose from 37 to 52 percent.) 
Ukrainians  were somewhat  more likely after  the coup attempt  to think 
that  it is worthwhile  to convince their  bosses to put  a good idea  into  prac- 
tice. (Yes answers  to question  D3 rose from  53 to 63 percent.)  After  the 
coup, respondents  were slightly  less likely to think  that  the government 
might  ruin  all the pleasure  from earning  money. (Yes answers to ques- 
tion H14  fell from  65 to 62 percent.) 
On  the other  hand,  some evidence suggests  that  people  perceived  that 
some aspects of the situation  worsened  after  the coup attempt.  More  re- 
spondents  foresaw a risk of nationalization.  (In question D03, the per- 
cent indicating  that nationalization  would be quite likely rose from  9 to 
17 percent.) Surprisingly,  more people anticipated a  Stalinist-style 
crackdown  on business leaders. (The percent choosing quite likely in 
question  D05 rose from  7 to 14  percent.) 
To further  check our  understanding  of the differences  wrought  by the 
coup attempt,  we asked respondents  in Kherson  to evaluate  the impact 
of the coup on their  experiences (as part  of our PC questionnaire  in De- 
cember 1991).  Their evaluations of the impact did not always closely 
correspond  with the changes in expectations between surveys. The 
changes  in expectations  caused by the coup are perhaps  too small  to be 
accurately  measured  with our methods. 
From our evidence and experience, we conclude that the dramatic 
event of the dissolution  of the Soviet Union changed  situational  percep- 
tions-but  only somewhat.  This evidence suggests that  we should  tem- 
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Table 2.  International Comparisons of Situational Factors 
P values, except where indicated 
Ex-commuinist  Eastern  Germany  Russia 
versus  versus  versus 
advanced  capitalist  wvestern  Germany  Ukraine 
Questiona  P  valueb  Directionc  P  valu.eb  Direction'  P  valiieb  Directionc 
D3  0.000  +  ...  0.740  - 
H5  0.000  +  0.000  +  0.140  + 
HII  0.000  +  0.437  -  0.690  + 
H13  0.004  +  ...  0.362  + 
H12  0.000  +  .  ..  0.125  + 
H1O  0.004  +  ...  0.001  + 
H7  0.074  +  ...  0.624  - 
H14  0.000  +  0.623  +  0.165  - 
D03 (1 only)  0.000  +  ...  0.098  + 
M5  ..  ...  0.782  + 
D02 (1 only)  0.000  +  0.249  -  0.355 
G16  0.000  +  0.000  + 
K2  0.011  +  .  .  .  0.301  + 
K3  0.017  +  ...  0.000  + 
Summary statistiCd 
Economic  advantage  92  40  15 
for second countries 
(percent  significant) 
Economic  advantage 
for first  countries 
(percent  significant)  0  0  0 
Source: Authors'  calculations  using survey results presented  above. 
a. Questions  appear in the order that they are discussed  in the paper. 
b. Each p value is the probability,  in a sanmple  this size,  of obtaining a z statistic  whose  absolute  value is as large 
as we found. By convention,  a result is statistically  significant (that is, acceptable  as evidence  of genuine differences 
between  countries)  if the p value  is less  than 0.050.  The threshold p value  should  properly be adjusted for sample 
size,  for considerations  regarding power,  and for the relevant alternative  hypothesis.  Zero values  shown  are caused 
by rounding. The true p value  is never zero. 
c.  A plus sign indicates that the results for this question  imply economic  disdvantages  for the first country listed. 
A minus sign implies economic  disadvantages  for the second country listed. The plus and minus signs appear whether 
or not the answer is statistically  significant. 
d. The last rows tabulate the proportion of significant  +  and significant  -  results. 
stitutions change. People in Kherson may have not perceived the 
importance  of the coup attempt  in the way we at a distance might  have 
expected. The view that  the coup attempt  was the most dramatic  change 
in the history of the Soviet Union may have been a perception  shared 
only by Muscovites and Westerners.  No major  action or significant  dis- 
ruption  of everyday life occurred in Kherson at the time of the coup; 
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Table 3.  International Comparisons of Attitudinal Factors 
P values,  except  where indicated 
Ex-cominunist  Eastern Germany  Russia 
versus  versus  versus 
advanced capitalist  western Germany  Ukraine 
Question'  P  valueb  Direction''  P valiueb  Direction'  P  valiieb  Direction" 
M11  0.012  -  .  .  .  0.249  - 
H4  0.921  -  ...  0.664  + 
H3  0.258  -  0.733  +  0.307  + 
H8  0.035  +  1.000  0.033  - 
M6  0.000  +  ...  ... 
M6a  0.296  +  0.333  +  0.140 
C12  0.002  +  ...  ... 
H6  0.218  +  0.514  -  0.000  + 
H 1  0.006  -  0.000  -  0.057  - 
H2  0.311  -  .  .  .  1.000 
D7  0.000  -  0.006  -  0.608  - 
H9  0.000  +  0.629  +  0.884  + 
C1l  0.001  +  ... 
Sliminamy  statistic' 
Economic  advantage 
for second countries 
(percent significant)  38  0  10 
Economic  advantage 
for first countries 
(percent significant)  23  29  10 
Source  and notes: see table  2. 
cow television, albeit somewhat  unusual.  A watershed  event may have 
to be more  palpable  and dramatic  to ordinary  citizens, or it may have to 
offer  concrete  evidence of the direction  of change  in the economic situa- 
tion, before  it causes people to substantially  change  their  perceptions  of 
their  situation. 
Summary  of International  Evidence on Situational 
and Attitudinal  Factors 
Tables  2 and  3 summarize  differences  between ex-communist  and  ad- 
vanced capitalist countries in situational and attitudinal  factors that 
could affect  economic behavior.  These tables tabulate  all the responses 174  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
that directly reveal evidence of problems  that could impede work and 
other economic activities in a country.38  Many readers may disagree 
with  the way we group  questions  and  interpret  results. Some may argue, 
for example, that excessive ambition  and hard  work are not good per- 
sonality traits and that these traits do not promote happiness  and ful- 
fillment.  Nonetheless, some quantification  of differences  based on our 
(albeit  fallible)  judgments  could prove helpful. 
Table 2 examines situational  factors. Table 3 examines attitudinal 
factors. In each table, we compare answers three ways-between  ex- 
communist and advanced capitalist countries; between eastern and 
western Germany;  and between Ukraine  and Russia. We test whether 
there is a statistically significant  difference between answers in each 
pair. Our null hypothesis is that there is no significant  difference be- 
tween countries  in the number  of people who would choose the first  an- 
swer to the question. 
The  p value shown  for each question  is the estimated  probability  that 
the difference  we observed between countries  could be due entirely  to 
chance  in our  sampling,  rather  than  to a genuine  difference  in the popula- 
tions of the countries.  The  p value does not indicate  the potential  impor- 
tance of the difference  observed; sometimes  a small, not important  dif- 
ference can be statistically  significant.  Readers  can refer to the results 
of individual  questions  to judge the importance  of the differences  in re- 
sponses. 
A plus or a minus  sign after  the p value indicates  the direction  of the 
difference  between answers. A plus sign indicates that effective work 
will  be less likely-and  thus  implies  greater  economic  problems-for the 
first  country  (or class of countries)  in the column  heading.  A minus  sign 
indicates  greater  economic  problems  for the second country  (or class of 
countries).  The bottoms  of the tables  contain  two more  sets of statistics: 
the proportion  of the p values that are both statistically  significant  and 
imply relative economic advantage  for the second country or set of 
countries;  and the proportion  of p values that are significant  and imply 
relative  economic advantage  for the first  country  or set of countries. 
The first two columns in each table show comparisons  between ex- 
38. The tables omit a few questions  asked in ex-communist  and advanced  capitalist 
countries.  Questions  A6, A1,  A12, B9, C3, K6, and K0  do not help  us to directly  draw 
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communist  countries and advanced capitalist  countries. For these re- 
sults, the proportion  of respondents  from all ex-communist  countries 
who chose the first answer was compared  with the proportion  of re- 
spondents  from  all advanced  capitalist  countries  who also chose the first 
answer. In table 2, a plus sign in the second column indicates that the 
situation  in ex-communist  countries is more likely to cause economic 
problems  (because  the situation  provides  less incentive  to work  hard,  to 
maintain  a helpful  attitude,  or to make  long-term  investments).  In table 
3, a plus sign in the second column  indicates  instead that people in ex- 
communist  countries exhibit the attitudinal  traits that we have associ- 
ated with homo sovieticus: lack of leadership,  initiative, adventurous- 
ness, or entrepreneurship;  and  unwillingness  to accept responsibility  or 
take risks. 
The evidence in table  2 about  situations  in ex-communist  countries  is 
striking.  Ninety-two  percent  of the responses listed in column 1  of table 
2 are significant  and suggest  greater  situational  problems  in the ex-com- 
munist  countries. On the other hand, the evidence about attitudes  pre- 
sented in table 3 does not reveal such a consistent pattern  of difference 
between ex-communist  and advanced capitalist countries; the results 
seem to point  to a relative  advantage  for ex-communist  countries  almost 
as often (23 percent)  as for advanced capitalist  countries (38 percent). 
Thus, we find much more evidence of systematic differences  between 
ex-communist  and advanced  capitalist  countries  in situation  than  in un- 
derlying  attitude. 
The situation  in eastern  Germany  appears  more  favorable.  Compari- 
sons of eastern  Germany  and  western  Germany  reveal that  only 40 per- 
cent of the situational  questions  (table  2, columns  3 and  4) yielded  results 
that  were significant  and suggestive  of greater  problems  for the eastern 
Germans.  Thus  the differences  in situation  between  eastern  and  western 
Germany  are  much  less striking  than  the difference  between  ex-commu- 
nist and advanced  capitalist  countries  as a group.  This is not altogether 
surprising  because eastern  Germany  has adopted  the laws and govern- 
ment  of western  Germany.  The comparisons  of attitudes  between east- 
ern  and  western  Germany  (table  3, columns  3 and  4) work  in the opposite 
direction, indicating  an advantage  for eastern Germans  over western 
Germans.  Taken  together,  these results  provide  relatively  little net evi- 
dence that  eastern  Germans  face greater  economic problems  than  west- 
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The comparisons of Russians with Ukrainians also appear in tables 2 
and 3, columns 5 and 6. These results are not presented  as tests  of the 
basic homo sovieticus  theme of this paper because  Russia and Ukraine 
are both ex-communist  countries. That theme might suggest that no dif- 
ference in these dimensions should appear between Russia and Ukraine. 
In fact, we find little statistically  significant difference  in attitudes be- 
tween Russia and Ukraine,  and only a slight suggestion that Ukraine's 
situational factors  are more favorable than Russia's.  However,  when 
evaluating such a modest difference, we should bear in mind that we are 
looking at evidence  from only one city in Ukraine and one or two cities 
in Russia. 
Evaluating Short-Term  Outlook and Behavior 
Our evidence  suggests that while attitudes in ex-communist countries 
do not consistently  differ from attitudes  in advanced  capitalist  coun- 
tries, respondents in the two sets of countries consistently  differ in their 
perception of situations. The differences in situation were not always as 
strong as we expected  before we began this study. Nonetheless,  our re- 
sults confirmed that all the differences worked to the disadvantage of the 
ex-communist countries. 
From the results above,  it appears that the perceived  situation in ex- 
communist countries appears to encourage rational people to assume a 
relatively short-term mentality: they try to work their way through cur- 
rent problems as easily  as possible,  but try to avoid making any long- 
term commitments.  We asked several questions  to confirm such short- 
termism: 
D4. Imagine  that  the company  or organization  where  you work  now offers 
to everyone  a chance  to go through  a voluntary  education  program.  (You 
would not have to pay for it and it would take place in the evenings after 
business  hours.)  You would  learn  a lot about  the way your  company  oper- 
ates and how decisions are made by management.  You will be able to 
make  friends  with a lot of your colleagues. But this knowledge  and con- 
nections  would  hardly  be of use to you if you quit  your  present  job. Would 
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Responses  in percent 
Survey 
Yes  No  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  64  36  106 
Ukraine  (post-coup)  47  53  114 
Russia (Omsk)  50  50  117 
United States  80  20  127 
Note  the wording: the knowledge  is company-specific  and not useful if 
the company fails or if the employee  quits. Ex-communist  respondents 
were  clearly  less  eager  to  make this company-specific  investment  of 
time. We think this reveals a serious problem in Russia and Ukraine, as 
do the results of the next question: 
D8. Could  it happen  that  in the next few years you would decide to leave 
the country  forever  (that  is, emigrate)? 
Responses  in percent 
Survey 
Yes  No  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  14  86  113 
Ukraine  (post-coup)  19  81  116 
Russia  (Omsk)  22  78  110 
United States  8  92  126 
While the differences  between  ex-communist  and advanced  capitalist 
countries are not as great as one might have expected,  the proportion of 
respondents who said they might emigrate was nearly twice  as high in 
Ukraine and nearly three times as high in Omsk as it was in the United 
States. This suggests that people in Ukraine and Omsk have a substan- 
tially lower incentive  to make long-term investments  in human capital 
or make investments  specific to the local economy.39 The next question 
also reveals serious short-termism. 
39. One  might  think  that  emigration  from  eastern  Germany  to western  Germany  would 
be vastly  greater  than  emigration  from  the former  Soviet Union  because  Germans  do not 
need to learn  a new language.  However, in a survey  reported  by Der Spiegel in 1991,  95 
percent  of eastern  Germans,  when  asked  if they  would  "continue  to remain  on the territory 
of the former  GDR,"  said, "I will, in any event, remain  here"  or "[I will] probably  stay 178  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
G  17.  Do you feel that  you, personally,  have been taking  more  initiative  to 
help your enterprise  be an effective on-going  business than you did five 
years  ago, or do you find  that  you are more  occupied  with other  matters? 
Responses  in percent 
Been  taking  Occupied  with  Survey 
more  initiative  other matters  size 
Russia (Omsk)  37  63  101 
Eastern  Germany  83  17  121 
Western  Germany  76  24  116 
Here a large and troubling difference emerges between  Russia and the 
advanced capitalist country. However,  in eastern Germany, unlike Rus- 
sia, this problem does not emerge. 
An important problem is suggested here for Russia and Ukraine. Peo- 
ple there are less  prepared to make investments  of their time that are 
specific to their current organization. This short-termism might be a sen- 
sible response to a situation in Russia and Ukraine in which many people 
expect current enterprises to fail (recall the responses  to question G16), 
and some readers may regard these results as unsurprising. Still, we are 
learning something here about the costs of deferring major economic  re- 
forms: the current problematic economic  situation does  not appear to 
be producing a return to serious effort or renewed concern for effective 
work. 
A bit of additional evidence  about short-term outlook  and behavior 
concerns the decision to start a family, as the next question reveals. 
M2. Do you agree  with the following  assertion?  "Because  in the near  fu- 
ture  our  economy  may  fall  apart,  young  people  shouldn't  start  a family  and 
raise  children.  It is better  to wait a few years, until  things  settle down." 
Responses  in percent 
Survey 
Yes  No  size 
Ukraine  (pre-coup)  34  66  103 
Russia (Omsk)  46  54  120 
here";  only 5 percent  said they would "probably  go to the West"  or "in  any event, go to 
the West."  See "Zehn  Jahre  bis zum Wohlstand?"  Der Spiegel, July 29, 1991,  p. 41-49. 
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Nearly  half  of the Russians  and a third  of the Ukrainians  are pessimistic 
enough  to postpone  having  children.40 
Have We Found Homo Sovieticus? 
Our limited evidence implies that attitudinal  factors are less  im- 
portant  than situational  factors  in influencing  how successfully ex-com- 
munist  countries  will make  the transition  to market  economies. The big- 
gest obstacles to a successful transition  do not seem to lie in the basic 
attitudes or psychological traits held by people in the ex-communist 
countries.  While some differences  in attitudes  do seem to occur across 
countries,  we do not see evidence to support  any designation  of the ex- 
communist  countries  as a group  in terms of these differences.  Attitudi- 
nal  differences  across countries  are complicated  and  are not easily sum- 
marized  with broad  generalities.  We think  that it is rather  misleading  to 
refer to homo sovieticus  as a distinct breed of person. 
Some observers  worry that people living in ex-communist  countries 
are timid  and fearful  of change and thus will try to apply  political  pres- 
sure  to resist privatizing  state enterprises.  It is argued  that  people living 
in ex-communist  countries  will resist moving  to jobs in productive  pri- 
vate firms  out of sheer  inertia  or lack of ambition.  Observers  worry  that 
unproductive  enterprises  will survive because people will be willing  to 
remain  in such firms  and work  for low wages, despite better  opportuni- 
ties. We doubt these conclusions. Political pressures may well be ex- 
erted against  privatization  and some people may be reluctant  to switch 
their  employers. However, our evidence suggests that the primary  rea- 
sons will not be greater  timidity,  fear of change, or lack of ambition  in 
the ex-communist  countries. 
On  the other  hand,  while our  results  are not always as dramatic  as we 
expected, our research  has consistently confirmed  that some problems 
worthy  of concern  exist for the ex-communist  economies of Russia and 
Ukraine.  These problems  are situational,  not attitudinal.  People trust 
current  institutions  relatively  less in the ex-communist  countries  and  are 
40.  Birth rates are declining in Russia. The crude birth rate (number of births per 1,000 
people)-in Russia was 17.2 in 1987; 16.0 in 1988; 14.6 in 1989; and 13.4 in 1990 (Narodnoye 
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less likely to expect their own current  efforts to succeed. Because of 
these problems,  Russia and Ukraine  exhibit a tendency for short-term 
outlook  and  behavior-a  tendency  that  we suspect is more serious  than 
the short-termism  that  is a feature  of current  U.S. election debates. Peo- 
ple in Russia and Ukraine  are more likely to expect the government  to 
create  serious  problems  that  will undermine  their  own efforts  to improve 
their own situation.  They are more likely to expect their enterprises  to 
be unrewarding.  They are more  likely to think  that  they may need to cut 
their losses and even emigrate. People there are less willing to make 
long-term  commitments  of their time, money, and other resources; to 
develop skills  related  to the market  economy;  and  even to have children. 
Part  of this situational  problem  might  be called a "bad  expectations 
equilibrium."  A Keynesian  vicious circle may be at work:  many  people 
do not invest in the current  system because they believe that it will not 
perform  for them;  they will not believe that the system will perform  for 
them until  they see it perform;  their  pessimism  and reluctance  may im- 
pede the system, and tend to cause the very disappointments  and fail- 
ures they feared. Perhaps  not much  can be done to correct  a bad expec- 
tations equilibrium.  Indeed, we do not know how to move out of such 
equilibriums-which we believe are a factor in the periodic  recessions 
that  plague  advanced  market  economies. The problem  is that  people do 
not change  their  expectations  quickly,  even when confronted  with such 
dramatic  events as the dissolution  of the Soviet Union. 
Another  aspect of the situational  problem  facing  Russia  and Ukraine 
is formal  laws and regulations.  The problematic  situation  we observe in 
Russia  and Ukraine  today in some ways resembles  the difficult  situation 
that  Germany  faced immediately  after  World  War  II when "fundamental 
uncertainty  over property  rights  and  the economic  rules  of the game  was 
significant."4'  Some help can be provided  now by drafting  laws, regula- 
tions, and  corporate  charters  to encourage  people to think  that  the situa- 
tion has changed. 
Other  parts  of the situational  problem  in Russia and Ukraine  may be 
more deeply rooted in popular  assumptions  about reciprocity,  implicit 
contracts, and social conventions. Why are people in these countries 
41. Alexander  (1991,  p. 17)  quotes  contemporary  observers  in Germany  at the end of 
World  War  II as saying  that  "there  is evident  a general  hesitancy  to make  any decisions  at 
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more  likely  to think  that  it is not worth  their  while  to try  to convince their 
boss to put a good idea into practice?  The answer  may be that different 
commonly  held  assumptions  exist about  a boss' responsibility  to reward 
an employee who presents a good idea-a  socially sanctioned  implicit 
contract  between  boss and  employee. Let us hope that  the situation  will 
be rectified  naturally  as firms  adopt the management  styles that tend to 
occur in profit-making  firms. Managers may learn such styles from 
Western  firms or they may independently  discover the advantages  of 
such styles. Alternatively,  the situation  may be changed  only by a kind 
of "social osmosis" as people learn by observing  one another.42  In the 
kind  of osmosis we envision, as people encounter  and  learn  about  differ- 
ent assumptions  held by others, they may gradually  change their as- 
sumptions  about the kind of deal that is naturally  struck with others. 
People may change such assumptions  very quickly  when they move to 
an advanced  capitalist  country and encounter  many other people who 
have different expectations and social conventions. The speed with 
which such changes occur within the ex-communist  countries may be 
much  slower  because people will often continue  to encounter  many  oth- 
ers with the old assumptions. 
Our study of the ex-communist  countries leads us to focus most of 
our concern  on Russia and Ukraine.  Eastern  Germany  is burdened  less 
by the problems  we have discovered in the other ex-communist  coun- 
tries. This is not because eastern  Germans  have different  attitudes  than 
Russians or Ukrainians.  Rather, eastern Germans  have different  per- 
ceptions as to the economic constraints  they face. They are more opti- 
mistic, more committed to produce in the current system, and more 
likely to adopt  long-term  thinking. 
42. See Sah  (1991). Comments 
and Discussion 
Sidney G. Winter: Have years of communist  rule produced  a human 
character  type that  is virtually  a different  species in terms  of its motiva- 
tional stance toward economic activity? If valid, this familiar claim 
would have dire implications  for the prospects  for transforming  the for- 
mer Soviet-style economies into Western-style  market  systems. With 
limited resources relative to the size of the question, but with a lot of 
entrepreneurial  verve, Robert Shiller, Maxim Boycko, and Vladimir 
Korobov set out to subject  this idea to some empirical  scrutiny. 
In my view, they largely succeed in achieving  their principal  objec- 
tive, delivering  a solid  blow to the credibility  of the homo  sovieticus  the- 
ory. If they have not quite succeeded in establishing  that  this hominid  is 
an out-and-out  fraud  like Piltdown  man, they have at least shifted the 
burden  of proof very substantially.  Anyone who thinks  that the legacy 
of communism  includes  a deep warping  of human  nature  at the motiva- 
tional  level is now challenged  to refine  his or her arguments  and explain 
how such reasoning  might  be reconciled  with the evidence in this paper. 
Quite  apart  from  its substantive  interest,  the paper  is a notable  exam- 
ple of a relatively  rare  art form in economic inquiry.  It is an unpreten- 
tious account of the results of a major  and novel data-gathering  effort. 
The authors  freely concede a number  of imperfections  and  potential  lim- 
itations  of their  work, and  they make  no attempt  to paper  over the inevi- 
table  untidiness  of an exploratory  project.  They also abstain  from  tying 
up all the results in a neat bundle.  The central  contrast  between "situa- 
tional"  and "attitudinal"  factors influencing  behavior  provides a spare 
but adequate  theoretical  structure  for the investigation. 
Some years ago, Wassily Leontief published  a sharp  critique  of the 
182 Robert J. Shiller, Maxim Boycko, and Vladimir Korobov  183 
allocation  of effort in economic research.  ' Those familiar  with that cri- 
tique will recognize  that  the contribution  of Shiller, Boycko, and Koro- 
bov represents  a genre  whose relative  thinness  Leontief  deplored.  Many 
economists, however, are either unfamiliar  with Leontief's critique  or 
unsympathetic  to it. They will seek to elucidate  the potential  hazards  of 
relying  on these novel data-an  effort  much  facilitated  by the openness 
of the authors  on that  very point. 
By contrast,  economists  often seem to have inordinate  respect  for of- 
ficial data relating  to familiar  economic aggregates,  and also for unoffi- 
cial estimates of what the official  data should or would be if such data 
existed. Such estimates were presented, for example, in Stanley Fi- 
scher's paper  in this issue, and the paper  itself and the discussion of it 
barely  touched  on the data  reliability  issue. While  I have no claim  to ex- 
pertise  on this issue, I do know something  about  the earlier  situation  re- 
garding  estimates of economic activity in the former  Soviet Union.2  All 
such estimates were tainted  with the statistical  counterpart  of original 
sin: ultimately,  they were all derivative  of Soviet administrative  statis- 
tics that, at their point of origin, were subject to strong incentives fa- 
voring  deceit over accuracy. I also know that, even in an advanced  and 
stable economy like that of the United States, abundant  grounds for 
skepticism  exist regarding  the products  of the official  statistical  system. 
Finally, I do not believe in miracles.  If 1,000  equivalents  of former  U.S. 
Commissioner  of Labor Statistics  Janet  Norwood had appeared  at key 
points  in the Russian  bureaucracy  and  statistical  system last September, 
I can imagine  that by now the system would be throwing  off the burden 
of statistical  original  sin. Absent such a miracle,  I literally  cannot  imag- 
ine what sort of process could now be generating  economic data  that  de- 
served  much  credence. 
It seems that  a characteristic  imbalance  exists in the profession's  typ- 
ical reactions  to economic data. Where  familiar  types of data are con- 
cerned, credulity is the norm and few questions are raised about the 
provenance  of the data. When the data are of some unfamiliar  type, 
skepticism  arises, and questions about the provenance  of the data re- 
ceive much attention-even  when, as in the current  case, those ques- 
tions have been largely  preempted  by a forthright  presentation. 
1. Wassily  W. Leontief,  "Academic  Economics,"  Science, July  9, 1982,  p. 904. 
2.  See, for example,  United  States  General  Accounting  Office  (1991). 184  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
Aside from  the fact that it presents  an obstacle that the authors  must 
overcome, this issue is largely tangential  to the concerns of Shiller, 
Boycko, and Korobov. I think, however, that it is broadly  relevant to 
the problem  of assessing the economic situation  in Russia and  the other 
emerging  economies. Economists,  governments,  and  international  insti- 
tutions  concerned  with helping  these economies would do well to study 
the possible application  of a variety  of economic measurement  methods 
that  do not involve reliance  on administratively  generated  data, such as 
the approach  used by Shiller  and  his colleagues. Use of these alternative 
methods  might  ultimately  entail a lessened reliance  on familiar  concep- 
tual  categories  and a greater  dose of "ad  hockery."  Arguably,  however, 
such  an approach  is quite  appropriate  in interpreting  the very unfamiliar, 
chaotic, and  rapidly  changing  situations  in these economies. 
As I have already  suggested,  I believe that  Shiller,  Boycko, and Kor- 
obov have established  their  main  point quite  convincingly,  especially as 
regards  the summary  results  on situational  factors presented  in the first 
column  of table 2. Their  evidence shows systematic  and significant  dif- 
ferences in situational  factors  that  tend  to handicap  ex-communist  coun- 
tries, relative  to advanced  capitalist  countries.  However, the results on 
attitudinal  factors are quite mixed. This supports  the view that situa- 
tional  rather  than attitudinal  factors pose the main  obstacle to progress 
in the emerging  economies. 
In the exploratory  spirit  of Shiller  and his colleagues, I have exam- 
ined the data from a different  perspective. On casual inspection, it ap- 
pears  that  the contrasts  among  the various  panels are not all that  impos- 
ing, whatever  their  origin.  This point  could be more  precisely  framed  as 
follows: consider your own answer to any of the survey questions to 
which only two alternative  answers  are offered.  Then, imagine  that  you 
are plunked  down at random  in the middle  of one of the settings  exam- 
ined in the surveys. You find  that your view on the particular  question 
is opposed by the local population  by a margin  of more  than  two-to-one. 
Can  you move to another  panel  location  and  be in the majority  by at least 
a two-to-one  margin?  The answer  is no. If your  opinion  is not  locally "re- 
spectable"  in the sense that at least one-third  of the locals agree with 
you, it is likely that it is a minority  opinion everywhere and that it is 
definitely  not a two-to-one  dominant  opinion  anywhere. 
In interpreting  this pattern  and  others discussed below, it is useful to 
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to survey  questions.  For questions  relating  directly  or indirectly  to elec- 
toral  politics, two-party  political systems pressure  both parties  toward 
the center:  what  is the point  of running  if no prospect  exists for persuad- 
ing more than half the voters to your position? For units smaller  than 
entire  polities (such  as the states of the United  States)  one expects to see 
some  units  voting  one way and  some the other,  often  by narrow  margins, 
when  the same  choice is faced by all (such  as presidential  elections). Dif- 
ferent  but not fully disjoint  from  these "electoral"  questions  are "pride" 
questions-ones  that tend to  evoke  characteristically  different re- 
sponses from  people of different  nationalities,  regions, races, religions, 
or ethnic  groups  on questions  of historical  interpretation  (whose was the 
achievement, or who was at fault), or on matters  of morals, ethics, or 
protocol.  If the resonances  with  the past  are strong  enough,  or if commu- 
nications  are  good enough  so that  the "correct"  group  view is effectively 
disseminated,  pride  responses may be evoked on contemporary  policy 
issues, as well. Obviously, pride  questions  tend to evoke response pat- 
terns  involving  strong  intra-group  unanimity  and strong  inter-group  dif- 
ferences: consider the attitudes of Italians, Native Americans, and 
Scandinavians  toward  Columbus'  "discovery"  of America  in 1492. 
The questions that Shiller, Boycko, and Korobov asked are neither 
electoral  nor  pride  questions;  they generally  ask what  choices are sensi- 
ble for individuals  in everyday life. The different  panels are driven  nei- 
ther toward  50-50 splits by electoral  politics nor toward  opposed 100-0 
splits  in different  panels  by pride  issues that separate  the panels. The re- 
sults seem to testify to a strong  underlying  homogeneity  in attitudes  and 
perceptions  of the human  situation  in everyday life-significant  situa- 
tional differences among societies notwithstanding.  There are hard 
questions  that reveal substantial  differences  of view in every panel and 
easy questions  that  do not. Easy questions  tend to be easy everywhere, 
and the answer  is the same. Hard  questions  evoke split verdicts  every- 
where, and  not by overwhelming  margins. 
To quantify  this impression,  I focused on the 30 survey questions  in- 
volving only two alternatives (ignoring  the cases where Russia and 
Ukraine  were the only panels  reported)  and sorted  them  into the follow- 
ing  four  categories: 
1. Strong  unanimity.  All panels  favor  the same answer  by margins 
of at least two-to-one. 
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nimity  does not prevail. (I counted a 50-50 split as agreement 
with the other  panels.) 
3. Weak  division. At least one answer  is supported  by at least 34 
percent  of respondents  in all panels, but neither  strong  unanim- 
ity nor  unanimity  prevails. 
4.  Strong  division. No answer commands  support  by 34 percent 
or more  of respondents  in all panels. 
As regards  strong  division, my earlier  statement  regarding  "respect- 
able" opinion anticipated  the results: in the 30 cases, no examples of 
strong  division occurred. Six examples of strong  unanimity,  11 of una- 
nimity, and 13 of weak division appeared.  Among questions exhibiting 
weak division, four miss unanimity  by slender margins,  amounting  to 
three percentage  points or less in a single country. The 49 percent of 
Americans  who answer "yes" in question H13; the 49 percent of Rus- 
sians  who answer  "no" in question  D7; and  the 47 percent  of Ukrainians 
(post-coup)  who express a preference  to give a small  speech in question 
M6a or answer "yes" to question D4 are slightly out of step with the 
view dominant  in the other panels asked the same question. A more 
striking  example  of weak division  is question  HI, which asks about  will- 
ingness  to work  very hard  for five years  if the reward  is to definitely  dou- 
ble one's living standards.  On this question  there would be strong  una- 
nimity on "yes" if only the Americans  and Russians were asked, and 
unanimity  if the western  German  view were ignored.  However, the pro- 
portion of western Germans  answering  "yes" is only 38 percent. This 
example  narrowly  misses being a case of strong  division, with the Rus- 
sians leading the pro-hard  work side of the split (69 percent) and the 
western  Germans  alone on the anti-hard  work side. But then, the west- 
ern  Germans  are  much  richer  than  the Russians  to begin  with, and  unlike 
most Americans,  they are much  richer  now than  they were a generation 
ago. Come to think  of it, they do take a lot of vacation. 
In conclusion, let me emphasize what the authors  themselves con- 
cede regarding  the role that situational  factors  may  play in the futures  of 
the emerging  economies. While  the outlook may be much  more  favora- 
ble than it would be if these countries  were actually  inhabited  by homo 
sovieticus, it is not on that account a cheerful outlook. Improving  the 
incentives facing individual  actors requires  breaking  out of a "bad  ex- 
pectations  equilibrium"  through  roughly  concurrent  changes in behav- 
ior by many individuals  and institutions.  As the authors  indicate, that 
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Thomas Schelling: This paper  by Robert Shiller, Maxim  Boycko, and 
Vladimir  Korobov is the first  systematic survey of opinion  in Russia or 
Ukraine  that I've seen, so it is bound to be the only one attempting  to 
identify  attitudes  pertinent  to the forthcoming  market  for businesses and 
jobs. Some of the survey  questions  are straightforward;  others  are  imag- 
inative  efforts to offer parallels-even  metaphors-to  compare  Ameri- 
can with Russian responses to hypothetical  situations  that may reveal 
something  like lasting personality  traits. Some of the questions, in my 
judgment,  succeed. Some fail-fail  in the sense that  I do not see a plaus- 
ible translation  of answers into attitudes. The effort to contrast situa- 
tional with attitudinal  factors makes the most useful distinction;  how- 
ever,  I  think it  does  not  always  work.  The  authors offer  their 
interpretations,  but readers are free to translate  the questionnaire  re- 
sults as they please. This was a pioneering  enterprise  and, like most pi- 
oneering  enterprises,  presents  findings  that  often are puzzling. 
My strongest  reactions are skeptical;  for brevity, I offer only those 
strongest  reactions. I am skeptical  of specific questions, not critical  of 
the effort, or even of the results. I think the authors  may have been a 
little  incautious  in interpreting  the results-much  less so in the draft  be- 
ing published.  Perhaps  the reader  is better  challenged  as a result. 
One object of this inquiry  is attitudes  and opinions among  Russians 
and Ukrainians  toward  entrepreneurship  and business management.  A 
random  sample  is appropriate  if we think  that popular  attitudes  of that 
kind  affect  the behavior  of consumers  and  workers.  If instead  we are in- 
terested in potential  entrepreneurs,  we should be trying  to sample not 
the whole population  but rather  the people who have any likelihood  of 
being  in a position  to start  a new business  or manage  one. Whether  a coal 
miner  would  rather  be a production  manager  or a financial  manager  if he 
had the opportunity  to choose probably  is not of much  interest  to us. It 
is not obvious  to me what  fraction  of the population  we might  like to dis- 
play entrepreneurial  spirit: 1 percent; 5 percent; or 20 percent?  I sup- 
pose a main  reason  for sampling  Americans  and Russians  for compari- 
son  would be  that we  have  some  idea  whether Americans are 
insufficiently,  excessively, or optimally  interested  in adventurous  acts 
like switching  jobs and starting  new businesses. 
In  approaching  the survey  results,  I didn't  really  know  what  to expect 
of Russians  and Ukrainians,  but (if I had thought  to ask myself) I prob- 
ably would have had a pretty good idea of what to expect among U.S. 
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the survey is that  many  Americans  gave answers  that shock me. I have 
difficulty  even comparing  Russian  results  with U.S. results  and  I am led 
to wonder  how respondents  interpreted  the questions,  particularly  when 
they had to supply  instant  answers  to questions  to which they probably 
had not given much  thought. 
Consider  question  H14. "Do you agree  with the following  statement? 
'The government  can give so much trouble  and nuisance  to rich people 
that it spoils all the pleasure  that the money may bring.' " I would have 
expected that among the very rich in the United States, some respon- 
dents  would  have been so disgruntled  with  government  interference  that 
they might  have chosen to agree  openly with such an extravagant  state- 
ment, but it is hard  to believe that anybody  could really  mean  it. The 38 
percent of Americans who agreed with the statement cannot all be 
wealthy entrepreneurs  who have to cope with U.S. regulatory  bodies 
such as EPA and OSHA and EEOC. Mathematically  no more  than  half 
of that  38 percent  could be in the top income  quintile,  so I simply  cannot 
find any interpretation  of this answer that makes sense for Americans. 
And if I cannot  take the Americans  seriously, it is hard  to know how to 
interpret  the Russians  and  the Ukrainians. 
Again consider question  D03.  "How likely do you think  it is that in 
the next five years the government  will, in some way, nationalize  (that 
is, take over) most private  businesses with little or no compensation  to 
owners? Is that quite likely, possible, unlikely, or impossible?"  Sixty- 
nine percent  of New Yorkers  consider  it not impossible.  The ranking  of 
the four possibilities-from  "quite  likely" at one extreme to "impossi- 
ble"  at the other-puts  "unlikely"  next to "impossible,"  but  whether  the 
53 percent  of New Yorkers  who chose "unlikely"  meant  more  than  pos- 
sible, or something  between possible and  impossible,  is hard  to guess. I 
simply  do not know what the New Yorkers  had in mind, unless a New 
Yorker  considers  almost  nothing  impossible  and  will answer  "unlikely" 
to all kinds  of outrageous  propositions. 
Then  there  is question  D02. "How  likely do you think  it is that  during 
the next five years the standard  of living could fall dramatically:  people 
will have less food, they will have less clothing  and  other  goods, and  the 
quality  of the goods also will deteriorate  substantially?"  Again  we have 
the difficulty  of interpreting  "possible"  and "unlikely,"  but the answers 
from  the continental  United States express a pessimism  that  I find  com- 
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Americans  consider  it not impossible  and-again,  subject  to the ranking 
of the four answers-62  percent consider it not unlikely. It is hard  for 
me to believe they really  do. 
I even had some difficulty  with question  D8. "Could  it happen  that in 
the next few years you would decide to leave the country  forever?"  I 
think I would have found the Ukrainian  and Russian figures-both 
around  20 percent-lower  than I expected. Furthermore,  I would have 
thought  the figures  for those two countries  would be at least ten times 
higher  than  the figure  for the United  States. However, the Russian  figure 
is less than triple the U.S. figure  and the Ukrainian  figure  is less than 
double. Until I can figure  out what kinds of Americans  we are dealing 
with, I shall have trouble  understanding  the Russian  and Ukrainian  an- 
swers. Maybe  the key to the U.S. answers  is in the formulation,  "could 
it happen,"  or maybe respondents  didn't  listen carefully  to "in the next 
few years"  and some people who had immigrated  to the United States 
thought  of eventually  returning  to their native countries  after they had 
retired.  But if 8 percent  of the respondents  translates  into 10  or 15  million 
adults  who answer  that  it "could  happen"  that  they would emigrate,  it is 
hard  for me to know what they had in mind.  Taken alone, I might  have 
thought  I knew  what  Russians  and  Ukrainians  had  in mind.  But the U.S. 
answers  confound  me, and alongside  these, I don't know what to think 
about  the Russian  and Ukrainian  responses, either. 
Question H4 poses the kind of question that invites my skepticism. 
Respondents  are asked  to imagine  that  they are suddenly  ill and  will feel 
tired  all their  lives unless they undergo  a surgical  operation  that entails 
one chance in four of death. The survey asked, "Would  you decide to 
undergo  this operation?"  I do not see how a person  could give a serious 
answer  to the question  in the time that  the interviewer  waited  for an an- 
swer, so I interpret  the answers  as not serious. Whether  Americans  who 
give answers  that  are not serious  tend to give the same answers  as Rus- 
sians  who give answers that are not serious I do not know, but it looks 
as though  there  is a remarkable  similarity  in the way Russians, Ukraini- 
ans, and  Americans  give snap  answers  to life-and-death  questions. 
I find  the interpretations  of some of the results unwarranted.  An ex- 
ample  is question C1I. "Do you think that it is likely to be difficult  to 
make friends  with people who have their own business (individual  or 
through  a small  corporation)  and are trying  to make a profit?"  Twenty 
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nese answered  yes. The authors  refer  to a yes answer  as a "negative  atti- 
tude toward  business people." I do not see why that  response is a nega- 
tive attitude.  Having  spent  almost  forty years  in an academic  career  and 
seven years  in the federal  government,  I think  on the basis of my experi- 
ence I would have to answer yes-not  because business people are un- 
friendly or because I couldn't be friends with somebody who was at- 
tracted  to profit, but simply because my opportunities  to meet people 
who have their  own businesses in circumstances  in which we might  be- 
come friends  are rare.  A yes answer  here may be a negative  attitude  to- 
ward  one's own circumstances.  If the question  had been about  friendli- 
ness and  compatibility,  it might  have yielded  a significant  interpretation. 
In the same  way, I question  the characterization  of a negative  answer 
to question  HI-unwillingness  to work  fourteen  hours  a day, six days a 
week, for the next five years in order  to double one's level of well-be- 
ing-as  a lack of "ambition."  At least I want to hear respondents'  an- 
swers to the follow-up  question, "Why  are you unwilling?"  If one is to 
be ambitious  primarily  for one's children,  it isn't easy to know whether 
absenting  oneself fourteen  hours  a day, six days a week for five years  for 
the sake of a larger  family  income is the best or the worst thing  one can 
do for one's children. 
A conclusion I come to is that many of these survey responses are 
exceedingly  difficult  to interpret. 
General Discussion 
Several commentators  suggested  that persistent  differences  in expe- 
rience  are  likely  to lead  to deep-seated  differences  in attitudes,  thus  blur- 
ring  the distinction  between situational  and  attitudinal  influences.  Janet 
Rothenberg  Pack described  the general  issue as being how quickly  be- 
havior  changes  when  the situation  changes.  She offered  some conflicting 
observations  from  other  episodes of social change.  The literature  in agri- 
cultural economics indicates that, as prices and markets have been 
freed, farmers  have responded to economic incentives, regardless  of 
their  previous  cultural  and  economic environment.  By contrast, studies 
of the survivors  of German  concentration  camps show that  their subse- 
quent  behavior  was permanently  influenced  by that  experience.  William 
Brainard  observed that the Great  Depression  permanently  affected the Robert J. Shiller, Maxim Boycko, and Vladimir Korobov  191 
attitudes  of a generation.  Sidney Winter  added  that many  people in the 
former  Soviet Union were killed simply  for being successful farmers- 
the "liquidation  of the kulaks."  He suggested  that testing  age-cohort  ef- 
fects and geographical  differences could shed some light on whether 
these traumatic  events continue  to affect current  attitudes. 
Some panelists  offered  comments  about  how to interpret  responses, 
particularly  ones that  seemed  puzzling.  Robert  Hall  noted  that  questions 
asking  whether  a certain  event was possible would get some minimum 
positive response because some people believe "anything  is possible." 
Alan Blinder suggested that a noticeable fraction of people will give 
crazy answers  to any question, citing Patrick  Buchanan's  political  sup- 
port  this spring  as a current  example. Cross-country  comparisons  could 
be affected if what passed for crazy answers differed  in different  coun- 
tries. Similarly,  gender  and  other  demographic  differences  would  be ex- 
pected to affect answers systematically. However, Robert Shiller re- 
ported that the  same percentage of  telephone respondents in  all 
countries were women-about  60 percent-so  that gender should not 
bias comparisons.  Thomas  Schelling  added  that  the habit  of not answer- 
ing questions  truthfully  or at all in a communist  country  might  have in- 
fluenced  the reliability  of the Soviet responses. Shiller  reported  his in- 
formal  impression  that people were most willing  to cooperate  with the 
survey  in Russia  and  least cooperative  in New York. On the other  hand, 
Russians  were more  likely  to reply  "no  answer"  to some questions  when 
being  interviewed.  He was not sure  what  to make  of this. 
William  Nordhaus  observed that questions could be interpreted  dif- 
ferently by people from different regions-as  opposed to being an- 
swered  differently,  given a common  interpretation.  He suggested  having 
social scientists  from  the different  regions  explain  what  they thought  the 
questions  meant  in order  to see if they all interpreted  them in the same 
way. Benjamin  Friedman  noted that, for some events, many  more  peo- 
ple contemplate  an action than ever take it: he offered the known evi- 
dence on suicides as an example. He suggested that this phenomenon 
might  help  explain  some questionnaire  responses  that  appeared  to be far 
out of line with observed  behavior. 
Holger Wolf suggested that the striking  similarity  between eastern 
and  western  German  responses may be due to the influence  of western 
German  television, which had been accessible to the eastern Germans 
for  40 years.  This  might  also help  explain  differences  within  the FSU be- 192  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
tween areas  that  could receive Western  TV and areas  that  could not. In 
his own travels, he had found that Tallin, an Estonian  city that had re- 
ceived Finnish television for many years, had the feeling of a market 
economy, in contrast  with the Ukrainian  city of Kiev, which had been 
isolated from Western  television. He suggested  testing the influence  of 
television by seeing if survey responses differed  significantly  between 
parts of eastern Germany  that could not receive western German  TV 
and  the rest of eastern  Germany. Robert J. Shiller, Maxim Boycko, and Vladimir Korobov  193 
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